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CAR-VING OUT NOTIONS OF PRIVACY: THE 
IMPACT OF GPS TRACKING AND WHY 
MAYNARD IS A MOVE IN THE RIGHT 
DIRECTION 
In a controversial decision in 2010, the D.C. Circuit held that 
warrantless GPS tracking of an automobile for an extended period of 
time violates the Fourth Amendment.  The D.C. Circuit approached the 
issue in a novel way, using “mosaic theory” to assert that the aggregation 
of information about an individual’s movements, over an extended period 
of time, violated an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This 
Note discusses how state and federal courts have dealt with warrantless 
GPS tracking, and ultimately asserts that the Maynard court’s decision 
was correct, insofar as it takes account of the interaction of changing 
technology and shifting societal notions of privacy.  This Note urges the 
Supreme Court to incorporate an approach similar to Maynard within its 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  This Note concludes that failure to do 
so will contract already-cramped notions of privacy in the digital age, and 
facilitate a normative shift in conceptions of privacy that may be 
detrimental and irreversible. 
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The needs of the day have swept away much that was sacred in the 
American heritage; the barriers of privacy have crumbled on 
many fronts.  It will be the task of the Supreme Court to attempt to 
preserve those which are left.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Society’s notion of privacy2 has evolved as civilization and 
technology have motored on.3  As technology’s progress encapsulates 
more in a smaller space (think microchips),4 so too has privacy become 
encased in ever smaller domains.  And, just as forward thinkers such as 
Justices Warren and Brandeis were compelled to assert and carve out 
privacy notions to combat what they saw as invasive technology,5 a new 
generation should push against the continuing erosion of privacy by 
technology, lest society may never get its privacy back.  Nothing more 
                                                 
1. JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A 
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 270 (1966). 
2. Privacy is one of the more amorphous terms in the law, and “there is no universally 
accepted philosophical definition of ‘privacy.’”  Anita L. Allen, Privacy-as-Data Control: 
Conceptual, Practical, and Moral Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861, 864 (2000).  
However, Alan Westin’s definition is instructive: “Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, 
or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about 
them is communicated to others.”  ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).  For 
a well-developed synopsis of competing notions of privacy, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL 
M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 39–76 (3d ed. 2009). 
3. MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 11 (2007) (“During the twentieth century, conceptualizations of 
privacy have gradually evolved from privacy as the right to a private, physical space to privacy 
as the right to control access to and the use of personal information.”). 
4. See Russell D. Covey, Pervasive Surveillance and the Future of the Fourth 
Amendment, 80 MISS. L.J. 1289, 1289–94 (2011) (noting that rapid advances in technology 
have occurred and will continue to; one such advance is computer chips becoming more 
powerful and shrinking in size). 
5. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
193 (1890) (“[T]he right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,—the right to be let 
alone . . . .”).  The article was a response to “snapshot cameras,” whose use along with gossip-
type media was seen as invasive to guarded notions of privacy at the time.  Id. at 195–96. 
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succinctly displays the invasiveness of technology than the use of GPS 
tracking by law enforcement (often without a warrant) to monitor every 
movement of a person in an automobile for extended periods of time.6 
An example illustrates this point in more detail.  In 2010, Yasir Afifi, 
a twenty-year-old American citizen who is half-Egyptian, discovered a 
GPS tracking device hidden in the undercarriage of his automobile 
during a routine maintenance visit to a local garage.7  The discovery was 
surprising for several reasons: (1) there had been no evidence that the 
device was placed with a warrant; (2) there had been no specific 
justification given by the FBI (who allegedly placed the device) about 
why Afifi was being tracked;8 and, most striking of all, (3) the FBI 
arrived shortly after Afifi’s friend posted images of the device on the 
Internet and allegedly told him that they had been tracking him for three 
to six months.9  Afifi subsequently filed a federal lawsuit,10 alleging that 
the locational information the FBI had gathered about him detailed “the 
persons with whom Mr. Afifi associated, the hospitals he attended, the 
organizations of which he was a member, the religious services he 
frequents, [and] the restaurants he went to with friends and families.”11  
Even without delving further into the intricacies of the Afifi case, this 
discovery should raise eyebrows solely because it is a harbinger of what 
is to come (and is already happening)—the warrantless tracking by law 
enforcement of an individual’s every movement in an automobile for a 
significant duration of time. 
                                                 
6. See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1195–96 (N.Y. 2009) (“[A GPS] device 
remained in place for 65 days . . . .  This nonstop surveillance was conducted without a 
warrant.”). 
7. Kim Zetter, Caught Spying on Student, FBI Demands GPS Tracker Back, WIRED 
(Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/10/fbi-tracking-device/. 
8. Id.  And this is not an isolated case.  Afifi’s attorney stated that “after learning about 
Afifi’s experience, other lawyers in her organization told her they knew of two people in Ohio 
who also recently discovered tracking devices on their vehicles.”  Id.  The government has not 
denied this practice.  See Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2 n.1, United States v. 
Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Investigative agents of the United States Department 
of Justice employ this method of surveillance with great frequency.”). 
9. See Zetter, supra note 7. 
10. Bob Egelko, San Jose Arab American Sues FBI over GPS, SFGATE.COM, Mar. 3, 
2011, http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-03-03/bay-area/28648677_1_gps-device-fbi-agent-fbi-direc 
tor-robert-mueller. 
11. Complaint at 13, Afifi v. Holder, No. 11-00460 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2011).  Afifi’s case 
has been stayed, pending the outcome of United States v. Jones.  Order Granting Plaintiff’s 
Motion to Stay at 1, Afifi v. Holder, No. 11-00460 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2011). 
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To say that this type of GPS tracking has enflamed the already-
contentious argument about how far the government can go to prevent 
and respond to crime would be an understatement.12  One need only 
look to Judge Kozinski’s dissent after a denial of a rehearing en banc in 
United States v. Pineda-Moreno to observe the alarm: “The needs of law 
enforcement, to which my colleagues seem inclined to refuse nothing, 
are quickly making personal privacy a distant memory.  1984 may have 
come a bit later than predicted, but it’s here at last.”13  One could argue 
that, while the warrantless electronic monitoring of automobiles might 
indeed be an alarming encroachment on privacy, the Orwellian 
rhetoric14 is overblown because automobile travel invariably occurs in 
public, and the Supreme Court has previously held that “[a] person 
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”15  
However, automobiles are a mainstay in the life of the American public 
and are vital to its commerce and interconnectedness.16  Use of 
                                                 
12. See Adam Cohen, Big Brother Is Watching, TIME, Sep. 13, 2010, at 53; John W. 
Whitehead, GPS and the Police State We Inhabit: Living in Oceania, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-w-whitehead/gps-and-the-police-state-
_b_740348.html. 
13. United States vs. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting), petition for cert. filed, No. 10-7515 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010). 
14. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 7 (2004) (“The dominant metaphor for modern invasions of privacy is 
Big Brother, the ruthless totalitarian government in George Orwell’s novel 1984.”).  Big 
Brother’s totalitarian government attempts to wipe out privacy notions by using various 
forms of surveillance, “constantly monitoring and spying” on its citizens, who have no way to 
know if they are being watched.  Id. at 29.  Orwell and dystopia have been invoked by many 
courts and commentators in reference to GPS tracking.  See United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 
640 F.3d 272, 275–76 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating that GPS is “a technology surely capable of 
abuses fit for a dystopian novel”); Phillip R. Sumpter, Note, Is Big Brother Watching You? 
United States v. Pineda-Moreno and the Ninth Circuit’s Dismantling of the Fourth 
Amendment’s Protections, 2011 BYU L. REV. 209, 209–10 (2011) (arguing that the court in 
Pineda-Moreno was “enabling the creation of a modern-day Oceania”); David Kravets, Judge 
Calls Location-Tracking Orwellian, While Congress Moves to Legalize It, WIRED (Aug. 24, 
2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/08/gps-privacy-crossroads/. 
15. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).  While “location information is not 
actually held by another,” this statement is generally an extension of the “third party 
doctrine,” which states that “a person retains no expectation of privacy in information 
conveyed to another.”  Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment 
Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 39–40, 43 (2011); see also FRED H. CATE, 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 58 (1997); Covey, supra note 4, at 1295. 
16. In 1960, there were over 60 million passenger cars on the road.  As of 2008, this 
number had more than doubled, to over 137 million.  BUREAU OF TRANSP. STAT., U.S. 
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automobiles is inexorably intertwined with the path that an individual’s 
life takes each day.17  It is not hard to argue, then, that by watching 
where an individual goes in an automobile, one can paint a precise 
picture of that individual’s life.  As the court noted in United States v. 
Maynard, 
 
[this] type[] of information can . . . reveal more about a person 
than . . . any individual trip viewed in isolation.  Repeated visits 
to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any 
single visit, as does one’s not visiting any of these places . . . .  
The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal still more; a 
single trip to a gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, 
but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby 
supply store tells a different story.  A person who knows all of 
another’s travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, 
a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an 
outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular 
individuals or political groups—and not just one such fact about 
a person, but all such facts.18 
 
Surveillance of this sort necessarily raises a critical question: Does a 
person have a reasonable expectation of privacy in all of his movements 
over a delineated course of time?19  And who determines what amount 
of time is presumptively reasonable or unreasonable—i.e., when is the 
government overreaching?20  Finally, what determinative test or rule 
                                                                                                                     
DEP’T TRANSP., NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS 2011, at tbl.1-11 (2011), available 
at http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/pdf/entire.pdf. 
17. This has been due to the shift from agricultural jobs to factories and offices, which 
have shifted work farther away from home.  This has necessarily had an effect on society’s 
notion of privacy.  See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 
1129–43 (2002). 
18. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied en banc 
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 
(2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), and aff’d on other 
grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (emphasis added). 
19. The concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” with regard to Fourth 
Amendment searches was first raised by Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
20. One time-based suggestion has been twenty-four hours.  See CONST. PROJECT 
LIBERTY & SEC. COMM., LIBERTY AND SECURITY COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON LOCATION 
TRACKING 5 (2001), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/LocationTrackingRe
port.pdf.  However, due to the particular nuances of criminal investigations, a time-based 
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exists to assert that “dragnet-type” surveillance is actually occurring and 
is violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable 
searches?21  Although the focus in answering these questions may be on 
GPS tracking at the moment, more advanced technology that may not 
need to be attached to an automobile to facilitate prolonged surveillance 
is surely on the horizon.  Thus, any solution to this problem must be 
significantly forward thinking to combat the slow creep toward 
becoming an increasingly panoptic society.22 
Courts at both the state and federal level have wrestled with the 
questions raised above, with disparate results failing to provide clarity.23  
Because this issue is constitutional and has given rise to a circuit split,24 
the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in Maynard to 
rectify the split.25  During the publication of this Note, the Court decided 
United States v. Jones; however, the focus here will not be on the Jones 
                                                                                                                     
approach should be viewed with caution because it could seriously impede legitimate and 
necessary investigatory processes that may not be able to culminate within that time. 
21. The holding in Knotts reserved judgment on the Fourth Amendment implications of 
“‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country,’” noting that “if such dragnet-
type law enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to 
determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 
283–84. 
22. The Panopticon was “the antithesis of public anonymity[,] . . . a model prison first 
imagined by Jeremy Bentham.”  CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 92–93 (2007) (citing 
JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON; OR, THE INSPECTION-HOUSE (1787), reprinted in 4 THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 37–172 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962) 
(1843).  While it was imagined as a prison, the total surveillance state it creates and the 
disciplinary mechanism that it enforces have together been interpreted as a way to control 
society, as well.  MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 
208–09 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books ed. 1979); see also SOLOVE, supra note 14, at 
30–31 (“[T]he Panopticon is not merely limited to the prison or to a specific architectural 
structure—it is a technology of power that can be used in many contexts and in a multitude of 
ways.”). 
23. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7–13, Pineda-Moreno v. United States, No. 
10-7515 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (discussing both the Federal Circuit Court split as well as the 
conflicting decisions in various state courts).  
24. Id. at 8 (“Four circuit court opinions demonstrate conflict and growing inconsistency 
in the federal courts on the issue of Fourth Amendment protection in cases of GPS 
monitoring.”). 
25. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011); see also Orin Kerr, Supreme Court 
Agrees to Review Case on GPS and the Fourth Amendment, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jun. 27, 
2011), http://volokh.com/2011/06/27/supreme-court-agrees-to-review-case-on-gps-and-the-
fourth-amendment/ [hereinafter Kerr, Supreme Court]. 
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holding.26  Rather, this Note’s primary focus will be on Maynard and 
other recent federal court cases that deal with Fourth Amendment 
issues under the the reasonable expectation of privacy test.  State court 
examples will be used to illustrate the general issue, as they have helped 
to guide the federal courts.  Additionally, it is presumed that the reader 
is familiar with GPS technology, insofar as it applies to tracking the 
movements of an automobile, and its admission as evidence.27  While it 
has also been argued that tracking via GPS can be halted by asserting 
that placement of the GPS tracker on someone’s automobile is a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment,28 this Note will focus solely on the issue 
                                                 
26. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  Unfortunately, the holding fails to 
clearly delimit the strictures of the Fourth Amendment when dealing with technology, opting 
instead to take an undeniably originalist approach to the question (through notions of 
trespass).  Id.  Consequently, the door has still been left wide open for mosaic theory to 
become part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and at least one commentator has argued 
that the concurrences in Jones give the impression that some Justices (possibly even five) may 
be ready to embrace it.  See Orin Kerr, What’s the Status of the Mosaic Theory After Jones?, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2012), http://volokh.com/2012/01/23/whats-the-status-of-the-
mosaic-theory-after-jones/.  Both Justices Alito and Sotomayor, in their concurrences, used 
Maynard-esque language, without actually adopting (or rejecting) Maynard, and they both 
reserved the issue of when (temporally) GPS tracking becomes an unreasonable search.  
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 962–64 (Alito, J., concurring in 
the judgment).  Justice Alito stated, “We need not identify with precision the point at which 
the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week 
mark.”  Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).  In her concurrence, Justice 
Sotomayor agreed with Justice Alito’s conclusion that “‘longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.’”  Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, 
J. concurring) (quoting id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment)).   
 The Maynard court offered a novel answer to the reserved question.  I will focus on 
Maynard’s novel resolution of this issue and where I think Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
should go.  Thus, despite Jones being resolved, the analysis in this Note is not moot; 
alternatively, the Jones decision leaves Fourth Amendment jurisprudence muddied and still 
ripe for reform to properly address changing technology. 
27. See generally Nathan J. Buchok, Plotting a Course for GPS Evidence, Note, 28 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2010) (examining the use of GPS technology as applied 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, ultimately concluding that “GPS technology . . . is 
reliable enough for use at trial”); Sarah Rahter, Privacy Implications of GPS Tracking 
Technology, Note, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 755 (2008). 
28. Many cases on both the state and federal level have also addressed Fourth 
Amendment seizure relating to the installation of GPS monitors on automobiles.  See United 
States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (noting that 
Fourth Amendment seizure issue raised by defendant “poses an important question and 
deserves careful consideration by the en banc court”); United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 
1127 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that placement of magnetized tracking devices did not deprive 
owner of dominion and control and thus “no seizure occurred because the officers did not 
meaningfully interfere with [the defendant’s] possessory interest in the [vehicle]”); 
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of whether doing so constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.  This 
narrow scope is necessary because GPS tracking and prolonged 
surveillance must be addressed under the reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard governing searches, lest we wish to revisit this 
argument once new technology emerges and tracking no longer requires 
a device to be physically attached to a vehicle—a necessary corollary if 
resolution is based on seizure.  Lastly, there may also be federal 
legislative methods to address the issue of GPS tracking; indeed, at least 
two bills have been proposed,29 and commentators have suggested this 
approach.30  This Note, however, will focus narrowly on a judicial 
solution. 
                                                                                                                     
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369 (Mass. 2009) (“[A]part from the installation 
of the GPS device, the police use of the defendant’s minivan to conduct GPS monitoring for 
their own purposes constituted a seizure.”).  Justice Stevens has also stated more generally 
that “[i]n my opinion the surreptitious use of a radio transmitter—whether it contains a 
microphone or merely a signalling device—on an individual’s personal property is both a 
seizure and a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”  United States v. Karo, 
468 U.S. 705, 728 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The question of seizure was before the 
Supreme Court, at its behest, in United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (“[I]n addition 
to the question presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the 
following question: ‘Whether the government violated respondent’s Fourth Amendment 
rights by installing the GPS tracking device on his vehicle without a valid warrant and without 
his consent.’” (emphasis added)).  This question could rein in the practice of warrantless GPS 
tracking by invoking the Fifth Amendment instead of the Fourth.  See Kerr, Supreme Court, 
supra note 25. 
29. Senator Ron Wyden and U.S. Representative Jason Chaffetz authored the GPS Act, 
which requires, inter alia, that law enforcement obtain a warrant before GPS tracking could 
be used.  H.R. 2168, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 1212, 112th Cong. (2011).  Senator Patrick Leahy 
has also introduced legislation that requires a warrant for GPS tracking, however, his 
proposal would amend the Electronics Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).  S. 1011, 112th 
Cong. (2011). 
30. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 802–07 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, New 
Technologies] (“[C]ourts should place a thumb on the scale in favor of judicial caution when 
technology is in flux, and should consider allowing legislatures to provide the primary rules 
governing law enforcement investigations involving new technologies.”); Kimberly C. Smith, 
Comment, Hiding in Plain Sight: Protection from GPS Technology Requires Congressional 
Action, Not a Stretch of the Fourth Amendment, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1243, 1276–78 (2011).  
However, legislative action is not without its detractors.  See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth 
Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 747 (2005).  Solove argues that “[w]here the courts have left open areas 
for legislative rules to fill in, Congress has created an uneven fabric of protections that is 
riddled with holes and that has weak protections in numerous places.  Therefore, Kerr’s claim 
that legislatures create more comprehensive and balanced rules than courts is simply not 
borne out by the evidence.”  Id. at 766. 
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This Note asserts that the Maynard court’s interpretation of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy through the “mosaic theory” is the 
type of interpretation that the Supreme Court should incorporate into 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and that prolonged GPS tracking 
without a warrant is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.31  This 
interpretation will be justified by using the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, applicable federal decisions, and relevant 
legal commentary.  This Note concludes that “mosaic theory” is a move 
in the right direction by illustrating that other interpretations and 
current judicial precedent are not sufficiently forward thinking to 
survive the onward march of technology. 
Part II of the Note surveys the Fourth Amendment legal landscape 
as it currently stands, articulating Supreme Court jurisprudence 
regarding the reasonable expectation of privacy.  Part III delves into the 
recent state and federal appellate court decisions and their conflicting 
interpretations of how GPS tracking comports with Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and state constitutions.  Part IV focuses on the Maynard 
decision and its use of “mosaic theory” to define the reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Part V argues that the Maynard approach to the 
reasonable expectation of privacy is a move in the right direction and 
may assist in curtailing the inevitable shrinking of privacy that continues 
to occur as technology advances.  Part VI concludes by positing that the 
Supreme Court should build upon the Maynard court’s interpretation of 
privacy and include that interpretation, or a forward-thinking analogue, 
within its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
II.  FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE—REASONABLE 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY WITH RESPECT TO “SENSE-ENHANCING” 
TECHNOLOGY 
A.  The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
pertinent part as follows: “The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated.”32  The Fourth Amendment would seem 
to not even address the issue of surreptitious tracking because it does 
                                                 
31. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562–63.  For an explanation of Maynard, see infra Part IV. 
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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not affect the security of people in their “houses, papers, and effects,” 
language that on its face seems to contemplate the invasion of 
something physical;33 however, the Supreme Court has construed this 
language in the Fourth Amendment quite expansively to include non-
physical intrusion.34  Typically, a non-physical intrusion occurs by 
“sense-augmenting” or “extrasensory” tools that allow us to ascertain 
information beyond which one’s normal human senses would permit.35  
The Court has addressed the use of these tools by law enforcement 
almost thirty times since 1927.36  Indeed, its interpretation has evolved as 
the Court has been confronted with novel challenges and technologies.37  
The genesis of non-physical invasion violating the Fourth Amendment 
began in Katz v. United States.38  There, the defendant was a gambler 
who placed wagers with a bookie, who was across state lines, via 
telephone from a particular telephone booth.39  The FBI placed a 
listening device on the outside of the phone booth to record his 
conversations.40  The government argued that the method of obtaining 
the evidence did not violate the Fourth Amendment because “the 
surveillance technique they employed involved no physical penetration 
of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls.”41  The 
                                                 
33. Prior to 1967, the Fourth Amendment was grounded only in property rights, and it 
protected only tangible objects from physical invasion.  THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 53–55 (2008).  
34. Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the ‘Reasonable Expectation of Privacy’: An Emerging 
Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1114–28 (1987) (“[T]he presence or absence of a 
physical intrusion ostensibly ceased to be the focal point of [F]ourth [A]mendment 
analysis.”). 
35. Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 432–33 (2007).  According to Hutchins, “[s]ense-
augmenting surveillance refers to surveillance that reveals information that could 
theoretically be attained through one of the five human senses.”  Id.  She goes on to state that 
“[e]xtrasensory surveillance . . . is that which reveals information otherwise indiscernible to 
the unaided human senses.”  Id. at 433. 
36. Id. at 423. 
37. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (acknowledging that the 
Fourth Amendment has not been “entirely unaffected by the advance of technology” when 
faced with a novel thermal imaging case). 
38. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  Katz was a direct refutation of Olmstead 
v. United States, where the court held that the Fourth Amendment applied only to material 
things.  277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
39. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 352. 
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Court rejected this argument, and the narrow application of previous 
case law,42 holding that the Fourth Amendment could be violated by 
actions that did not involve any physical intrusion—“Wherever a man 
may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”43  The Court explained that 
 
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.  What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.  But 
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible 
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.44 
 
While the holding in Katz was revolutionary for its expansive 
reading of the Fourth Amendment, it is more important today because 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence annunciated the test a court should use to 
determine if a non-physical invasion has violated the Fourth 
Amendment.45  At the outset of his opinion, Justice Harlan set the 
constitutional floor, explaining that “a person has a constitutionally 
protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”46  He further stated that a 
solely physical test was misplaced and was “bad physics as well as bad 
law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by 
electronic as well as physical invasion.”47  Thus, he stated that to 
determine if the Fourth Amendment is implicated, there is “a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
                                                 
42. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
43. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359. 
44. Id. at 351–52 (citation omitted).  Removing the physical intrusion element pushed 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence away from trespass doctrine, widening its scope and 
arguably expanding its open texture.  See Amy L. Peikoff, Pragmatism and Privacy, 5 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & LIBERTY 638, 657 (2010) (“[Justice] Stewart, like Brandeis and Douglas before him, 
want[ed] to disengage the notion of a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ from any remnant of the 
trespass doctrine.  He, too, want[ed] to keep as many options open as possible, with respect to 
what does or does not constitute a search.”).  While Katz was a push away from a property-
based notion, its approach has been criticized as well.  See Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a 
Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 564 (1990) (arguing that 
Katz is now merely an assumption of the risk doctrine, based on the language “‘knowingly 
expose[d] to the public,’” and that Katz actually takes away Fourth Amendment protections 
in a “high-tech society”). 
45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
46. Id. at 360. 
47. Id. at 362. 
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expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”48 
The Katz test thus has two parts: (1) that the individual exhibits a 
subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) that society is prepared to 
recognize the individual’s expectation as objectively reasonable.49  The 
first part of the test can be satisfied by the individual’s showing 
affirmative steps to protect his or her own privacy,50 like concealing 
items in a locked glove box, putting up high walls on their property, or 
not publicly listing their telephone number.  These affirmative steps 
have an outward element, allowing clear resolution of the first part of 
the Katz test.  The second part of the test—society’s acceptance of the 
expectation as reasonable—has been weighed much more heavily by 
courts and is more often contested.51  It has been argued that the 
uncertainty in this regard has resulted from the nature and extent of 
“the methods used by government to intrude into private places; . . . 
[the] privacy interests [that may exist in] a broad range of places and 
activities; and . . . the role that modern technology plays in enabling the 
government to intrude into places and activities that previously were 
inaccessible.”52 
Thus, while Katz “revolutionized Fourth Amendment search 
analysis”53 and “laid to rest most of the criticism that the law had 
become stilted and anachronistic in its attempts to accommodate 
modern investigative technology,” it was still often problematic in 
application,54 and at times even criticized by the Court itself.55  
Accordingly, although the Supreme Court has ruled numerous times on 
                                                 
48. Id. at 361. 
49. Id. 
50. Hutchins, supra note 35, at 428 (“[T]he Court has found that affirmative steps like 
erecting fences and packaging contraband in closed luggage are sufficient to satisfy the first 
prong of Katz.”). 
51. See Bennett L. Gershman, Privacy Revisited: GPS Tracking as Search and Seizure, 30 
PACE L. REV. 927, 928–29 (2010). 
52. Id. at 929. 
53. Wilkins, supra note 34, at 1087.  This is a decidedly non-originalist interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment.  See Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way 
Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV. 687, 687–712 (2011).  Marceau noted that “[i]nsofar as the Katz model 
of Fourth Amendment review reflects a rejection of stagnation and history, the Fourth 
Amendment represents an ongoing indignity to strict originalism.”  Id. at 710. 
54. Wilkins, supra note 34, at 1087–88. 
55. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 n.5 (1979). 
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this issue,56 its interpretations have often been muddled, and the 
resulting precedent more resembles a case-by-case, ad hoc approach 
than a hard and fast legal standard that is consistently adhered to.57  As 
one commentator has noted, “the highly elastic boundaries of the 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test ma[d]e judicial construction of 
the [Fourth Amendment] quite haphazard.”58  This erratic nature is 
evidenced in the cases that follow, and the varied interpretations to 
which commentators have ascribed. 
B.  More Recent Application of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy to 
Technology 
The Katz decision established the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test as the measure that later courts would use to evaluate searches 
under the Fourth Amendment.  But technology moved further still.  In 
1983, the Court had its first opportunity to address devices that facilitate 
tracking of subjects through surreptitious means.59 
In United States v. Knotts, the defendant was charged with 
“conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance”60 after one of the co-
defendants was reported by his employer for stealing chemicals that 
“could be used in manufacturing illicit drugs,” including chloroform.61  
Law enforcement officers placed a beeper (radio transmitter) in a 
chloroform container that was sold to the defendant.62  Officers then 
followed the subject, using both visual surveillance and monitoring of 
the beeper signal, to discover where the defendant was delivering the 
chemicals.63  While the police were following the defendant, he began 
making evasive maneuvers, and the police stopped their pursuit and lost 
                                                 
56. See Hutchins, supra note 35, at 423. 
57. See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
503, 504–05 (2007) [hereinafter Kerr, Four Models] (noting that “the meaning of the phrase 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ remains remarkably opaque” and stating, amusingly, that 
some Fourth Amendment scholars “suggest that the only way to identify when an expectation 
of privacy is reasonable is when five Justices say so”).  However, Kerr does go on to state that 
the Supreme Court’s precedent fits within four distinct approaches—an attempt to provide 
some clarity.  Id. at 506. 
58. Wilkins, supra note 34, at 1088. 
59. See generally United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
60. Id. at 277. 
61. Id. at 278. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
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visual contact.64  Despite the fact that the police were no longer able to 
follow the defendant on the ground, they were able to use a helicopter 
equipped with a monitoring device to locate the signal of the beeper and 
thus able to determine where the defendant had travelled.65  The 
defendant argued that tracking him using a beeper violated his 
reasonable expectation of privacy, and all evidence derived from it 
should be suppressed.66  The Supreme Court disagreed with the 
defendant, and held that the use of the beeper did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.67 
At the outset, the Court noted that “[t]he governmental surveillance 
conducted by means of the beeper in this case amounted principally to 
the following of an automobile on public streets and highways.”68  The 
Court was in essence analogizing the use of the beeper to another way 
to follow an automobile and perform visual surveillance.69  More 
germane to the Fourth Amendment argument, the Court stated that “[a] 
person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.”70  Further, the Court said that “[n]othing in the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory 
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science 
and technology afforded them in this case.”71  However, despite 
appearing to be highly deferential to the use of technology by law 
enforcement, the Court’s reasoning was not without qualification.  
Responding to the defendant’s argument that a verdict for the 
government would allow “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen 
of this country,”72 the Court proceeded cautiously, noting that “if such 
dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should 
eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether 
                                                 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 279. 
67. Id. at 285. 
68. Id. at 281. 
69. See Tarik N. Jallad, Old Answers to New Questions: GPS Surveillance and the 
Unwarranted Need for Warrants, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 351, 362 (2010) (“[T]he Court stated 
that the beeper tracking was akin to the physical following of the automobile on public 
roads.”). 
70. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
71. Id. at 282. 
72. Id. at 283 (internal quotations omitted). 
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different constitutional principles may be applicable.”73  This reservation 
of judgment on “dragnet-type law enforcement practices” has become 
the focal point of later cases grappling with technology that can arguably 
do such dragnet-type observation. 
Justice Steven’s concurrence in Knotts was much narrower and 
carefully limited to the facts before the Court.74  He noted that in Katz, 
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does inhibit police from 
augmenting their sensory abilities with technological advancements.75  
He argued, however, that just because “the augmentation in this case 
was unobjectionable, it by no means follows that the use of electronic 
detection techniques does not implicate especially sensitive concerns,”76 
a recognition that not all searches accomplished through technological 
advances may be constitutional in the future. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court eventually determined, years later, in 
Kyllo v. United States, that the reasonable expectation of privacy was 
violated when police used a device to search a defendant’s home, 
reasoning that the device used was not available to the public, provided 
extrasensory abilities, and invaded the protected space of the home.77  In 
Kyllo, the government used a thermal imager to see the heat generated 
in areas of the defendant’s home; the government used the imager to 
determine if the defendant was growing marijuana through the use of 
heat lamps.78  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia noted at the outset 
that “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured 
to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by 
the advance of technology.”79  The Court found that use of the device 
provided the police extrasensory abilities, and despite being used from a 
public space out in front of the house, its revelations about what 
occurred inside the house, including lawful activities, were an invasion 
                                                 
73. Id. at 284. 
74. Id. at 288 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
75. Id. 
76. Id.  The Supreme Court appeared ready to accept Justice Stevens’ words, at least 
somewhat so, in Karo, where the Court held that use of a beeper to track a person while they 
are in their home is a search under the Fourth Amendment.  United States v. Karo, 486 U.S. 
705, 714 (1984).  However, the Court’s decision is more a gesture of deference to the privacy 
in the home, like Kyllo, than a condemnation of technological surveillance.  See Kerr, New 
Technologies, supra note 30, at 831–36; see infra note 82. 
77. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
78. Id. at 29–30. 
79. Id. at 33–34. 
13-WEBB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  2:08 PM 
766 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:751 
 
of the reasonable expectation of privacy that one has within his or her 
home.80 
While Kyllo would appear quite favorable to defendants in cases 
involving any device that bestowed extrasensory gifts on the would-be 
discoverer (i.e., the police), it has been read more as a decision fortifying 
privacy protection within the home and less a decision limiting the use 
of extrasensory technology.81  But this decision has provided a basis for 
the argument that the location of the search alone should not demarcate 
the beginning or end of privacy.82  Notably, Justice Scalia’s decision 
appears to be forward thinking on its surface, stating that “[w]hile the 
technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we 
adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already 
in use or are in development.”83 
At the heart of Kyllo, though, is a formulaic inquiry that “can cause 
constitutional protections to rise or fall on the talismanic incantation of 
the sense-augmenting or extrasensory categories.”84  This classification 
                                                 
80. Id. at 40.  Justice Stevens disagreed about the scope of the rule, stating “[c]learly, a 
rule that is designed to protect individuals from the overly intrusive use of sense-enhancing 
equipment should not be limited to a home.”  Id. at 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
81. See Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment 
Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51, 116–23 (2002); April A. Otterberg, 
Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme 
Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 692–
93 (2005).  This deference to home protection was also the deciding factor in Karo.  See supra 
text accompanying note 76.  Some of the criticism of Kyllo arises because of this focus on the 
home, and the narrowness of the holding—the general result being that we are still left with 
the Katz test.  See Peikoff, supra note 44, at 662–71; supra text accompanying note 80. 
82. See Otterberg, supra note 81, at 694 (“[L]anguage in Kyllo . . . suggests the Court is 
beginning to recognize that technology often antiquates a Fourth Amendment analysis based 
purely on physical boundaries.”); see also Kerr, New Technologies, supra note 30, at 838–39.  
Professor Kerr argues that 
 
A “reasonable expectation of privacy” has not been equated with the expectation of 
privacy of a reasonable person; rather, it has been used as a term of art based 
heavily on property law principles.  As a result, existing Fourth Amendment rules 
are not necessarily the rules that sensible legislators might enact and reasonable 
citizens might desire.  Especially in the area of high technology, the property-based 
Fourth Amendment does not guarantee that the rules governing law enforcement 
are optimal rules that effectively balance the competing concerns of privacy and 
effective law enforcement. 
Id. at 838. 
83. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36. 
84. Hutchins, supra note 35, at 437. 
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has been heavily relied on in later cases, and if the Court has found that 
certain technology is merely sense-augmenting, that finding has typically 
(but not always) led the Court to uphold use of the technology.85  
However, this bright line determination should not be functionally 
dispositive of a violation of the reasonable expectation of privacy, as 
“the quantity of information that the technology can potentially disclose 
is also a critical component in assessing its proper constitutional 
treatment.”86 
While Kyllo makes a somewhat convincing push toward the sense-
augmenting or extrasensory dichotomy, this distinction is not fully 
explicative of the current law.87  Thus, Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has also been viewed more simply as relying on an 
“inside/outside” distinction.88  Essentially, anything that is “outside” is 
subject to surveillance by the government, and is not a search, but 
anything “inside” is more heavily scrutinized, and often ends up a 
                                                 
85. Id. at 432–38. 
86. Id. at 438.  For an argument that Kyllo’s bright line rules will indeed be fleeting, see 
Maclin, supra note 81, at 107–16. 
87. For example, in United States v. Place, the court found that a canine sniff was not a 
search, even though this extends human senses beyond their capabilities.  462 U.S. 696, 707 
(1983).  However, the court labeled dog sniffs as “sui generis,” and the “search” was 
extremely narrow because only illegal contraband was revealed, so the holding in this case is 
somewhat cabined.  Id.  (“We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited 
both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information 
revealed by the procedure.”); see also CLANCY, supra note 33, at 308.  Despite the sui generis 
label, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, was still not comfortable with the 
implication of the holding in Place, stating that 
 
the use of electronic detection techniques that enhance human perception 
implicates “especially sensitive concerns.”  Obviously, a narcotics detection dog is 
not an electronic detection device.  Unlike the electronic “beeper” in Knotts, 
however, a dog does more than merely allow the police to do more efficiently what 
they could do using only their own senses.  A dog adds a new and previously 
unobtainable dimension to human perception.  The use of dogs, therefore, 
represents a greater intrusion into an individual’s privacy.  Such use implicates 
concerns that are at least as sensitive as those implicated by the use of certain 
electronic detection devices. 
Place, 462 U.S. at 719–20 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).  This decision 
was upheld, post-Kyllo.  See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).  The Court distinguished 
the Caballes case from Kyllo by noting that the thermal-imaging device in Kyllo also exposed 
lawful activity, which is fundamentally different than hoping or expecting that illegal 
contraband will not be discovered.  Id. at 409–10. 
88. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1009–12 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment]. 
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search.  Stated a slightly different way, anything observable with the 
naked eye (or in plain view) does not garner Fourth Amendment 
protection.89  This approach somewhat adeptly explains the Supreme 
Court’s holdings in other Fourth Amendment cases: in Kyllo, the 
technology revealed something in a house, so it was a search; in Karo, 
the beeper went into a house, so it was a search; in Knotts, the beeper 
never invaded a private space, so it was not a search.  The Court has 
ruled along the same lines in other Fourth Amendment cases as well.  
For example, the Court has held that aerial observation is not a search 
because the public flying over the same spot could have seen the same;90 
analyzing garbage left on the street is not a search because it is in plain 
view;91 but manipulation of a bag, above and beyond simple observation, 
is a search.92 
The cases and approaches above provide the framework within 
which the GPS tracking question must be addressed, but the holes are 
obvious.  The GPS issue prods the unresolved Fourth Amendment issue 
about how new technology interacts within the existing framework, and 
has pushed the somewhat amorphous precedent to the point of near 
inflexibility.  At one extreme is Knotts, providing that anything a person 
does in public in an automobile is subject to no protection; at the other 
is Kyllo, suggesting that advanced technology may trigger Fourth 
Amendment protection because of its extrasensory characteristics.  
However, it is unclear if Kyllo’s holding can be extended outside the 
home.93 
                                                 
89. See Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing 
Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1410 
(2002); see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (“[I]f contraband is left in 
open view and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no 
invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no ‘search’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.”).  The Respondent’s brief in United States v. Jones attempts to chip 
away at this notion, with respect to GPS.  Brief for Respondent at 11, 29, United States v. 
Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (No. 10-1259).  The Respondent noted that “the government’s 
GPS device generated and stored a unique form and quality of data that was not exposed to 
the naked eye,” id. at 11, and that the “location and velocity calculations [that GPS provides] 
are materially different from what the human eye observes.” id. at 29. 
90. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–52 (1989); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 
476 U.S. 227, 238–39 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986). 
91. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). 
92. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000). 
93. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35–36. 
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III.  STATE AND FEDERAL APPELLATE LAW ON THE USE OF GPS 
TRACKING TECHNOLOGY, PRE-MAYNARD 
A.  Survey of State Law Influence on GPS Tracking 
Preliminarily, it should be noted that nine states have enacted 
statutes to address warrantless GPS tracking.94  At least ten other states 
have faced the issue judicially, and they are almost evenly split over 
whether a warrant is required to use GPS tracking as an investigative 
tool.95  Because of the lack of guidance at the federal level with respect 
to this issue,96 these cases have often turned on factual nuances and state 
constitutional interpretation, instead of judicial precedent.  
Additionally, because state courts are free to interpret their own 
constitutions more broadly than the baseline protections that the United 
States Constitution provides, state court decisions are only informative 
to the extent that they provide judicial perspective on potential federal 
                                                 
94. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335 (2010); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.06, 934.42 (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 803-42, 803-44.7 (West 
2010); MINN. STAT. §§ 626A.37, 626A.35 (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, §§ 176.6, 177.6 (2010); 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5761 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-140 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 77-23a-4, 77-23a-7, 77-23a-15.5 (West 2010).  The Delaware statute does contain an 
exception for “lawful use of an electronic tracking device by a law enforcement officer.”  
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335(a)(8).  “Lawful use” is extremely ambiguous; however, one 
court in Delaware has interpreted that statement to require a warrant.  See State v. Holden, 
No. 1002012520, 2010 WL 5140744, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2010). 
95. Four states courts have found warrantless GPS tracking impermissible: 
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 370 (Mass. 2009); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 
1195, 1203 (N.Y. 2009); State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1049 (Or. 1988); State v. Jackson, 76 
P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003).  Five found it permissible: Stone v. State, 941 A.2d 1238, 1250–51 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008); Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002); State v. Johnson, 
944 N.E.2d 270, 279 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010), appeal docketed, 943 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 2011); 
Foltz v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281, 292–93 (Va. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Sveum, 769 
N.W.2d 53 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).  The issue of GPS tracking as a search is currently before the 
Ohio Supreme Court, which must grapple with the split among the Ohio appellate courts.  
Compare State v. Johnson, 944 N.E.2d at 279 (“[P]lacing a GPS device on a vehicle to track 
the vehicles whereabouts does not constitute a search or seizure according to the Fourth 
Amendment and Ohio’s Constitution”), with State v. Jefferson, 8th Dist. No. 95950, 2011-
Ohio-4637 at ¶ 21 (Ohio App. Ct. Sep. 15, 2011) (holding that if defendant’s counsel had filed 
a motion to suppress GPS evidence, “there is a strong likelihood such motion would have 
been granted,” based on Maynard), and State v. White, 5th Dist. No. 2010-CA-60, 2011-Ohio-
4526 at ¶ 29 (Ohio App. Ct. Sep. 1, 2011) (“We respectfully disagree with our brethren in the 
Twelfth Appellate District.  We find . . . a warrant was required before placing the GPS 
tracking unit on the suspect vehicle and to continuously monitor the tracking signal.”). 
96. See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1202 (N.Y. 2009) (noting “the unsettled state 
of federal law” on the issue of GPS monitoring). 
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law.97  This Note will focus on the three state court decisions that are 
most germane and potentially influential to the larger federal question.98 
In State v. Jackson, the most prominent of the state cases and, 
arguably, the genesis of the argument against GPS tracking, the state 
court held that tracking via GPS is a search and seizure under the 
Washington Constitution and thus requires a warrant.99  The defendant 
in the case was convicted of first-degree murder after authorities used 
GPS tracking to locate the remote site where he had dumped his 
daughter’s body.100  Pursuant to a warrant, the GPS tracking devices had 
been attached to the defendant’s two automobiles (without his 
knowledge) while the automobiles were lawfully impounded; the GPS 
devices were used to track the defendant’s location for ten days.101  The 
court decided the case based only on an interpretation of Washington 
state law, and made almost no mention of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence; however, the court’s interpretation was generally in line 
with Fourth Amendment case law.102 
The court stated that something observed from a “lawful vantage 
point” merely through use of the senses is not a search.103  But, the court 
went on to say that “‘a substantial and unreasonable departure from a 
lawful vantage point, or a particularly intrusive method of viewing, may 
constitute a search.’”104  This precedent is consistent with the Kyllo quasi-
formulaic approach to extrasensory devices.105  With respect to GPS 
tracking, the court questioned the state appellate court’s determination 
                                                 
97. See Jallad, supra note 69, at 364–65 (explaining that state court decisions have 
“analyses [that] travel outside of the Fourth Amendment, [and thus] their authoritative 
guidance is limited since state courts are free to afford broader protections under their own 
constitutions”). 
98. For a discussion of other state cases addressing GPS monitoring, see Adam Koppel, 
Note, Warranting a Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised by Law Enforcement’s 
Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1061 (2010). 
99. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 224. 
100. Id. at 221. 
101. Id. at 220–21. 
102. See Koppel, supra note 98, at 1074 (“Though the Jackson court did not rely upon 
the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment case law, its focus on the potential intrusiveness of 
the technology was entirely consistent with the directive of the Katz line of cases.”). 
103. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 222; see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993). 
104. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 222 (quoting State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 598 (Wash. 1994)) 
(emphasis added). 
105. See Hutchins, supra note 35, at 437 (describing the quasi-formulaic approach in 
Kyllo). 
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that GPS devices were merely sense augmenting; the court noted, 
instead, that use of GPS does not equate to following someone on public 
roads, but rather “provides a technological substitute for traditional 
visual tracking.”106  Thus, the court determined that GPS was essentially 
extrasensory because the surveillance it afforded could not have been 
accomplished without interruption by law enforcement.107 
The court also focused on the potential intrusiveness that GPS 
tracking would inevitably lead to.108  Similar to the later interpretation 
by Maynard, the court noted that GPS could provide a detailed record 
of a person’s life, just based on where he or she went.109  The court 
further stated that “[i]n this age, vehicles are used to take people to a 
vast number of places that can reveal preferences, alignments, 
associations, personal ails and foibles,” all of which can paint a highly 
detailed portrait of an individual.110  Additionally, the court noted the 
common fear that this technology would be used to track individuals 
regardless of suspected criminal activity.111  Thus, the court held that 
people “have a right to be free from the type of governmental intrusion 
that occurs when a GPS device is attached to a citizen’s vehicle, 
regardless of reduced privacy expectations due to advances in 
technology.”112 
The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Weaver found, similar 
to Jackson, that use of GPS tracking was a violation of an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.113  In Weaver, the tracking was done 
                                                 
106. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223. 
107. Id.; see also Hutchins, supra note 35, at 449 (noting that the Jackson court 
“[i]mplicitly referenc[ed] the two categories of technology identified to date by the Supreme 
Court—extrasensory and sense augmenting—. . . [and] concluded that GPS surveillance 
should most fairly be treated as the former, and not the latter”); Otterberg, supra note 81, at 
681 (stating that the Jackson court found that GPS serves as “a total substitute for visual 
tracking and therefore was distinguishable from other sense-augmenting devices like 
binoculars” (citing Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223–24)). 
108.  Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223 (“[T]he intrusion into private affairs made possible with a 
GPS device is quite extensive . . . .”). 
109. Id.; United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied en 
banc sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
671 (2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), and aff’d on 
other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
110. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223. 
111. Id. at 224. 
112. Id. 
113. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (N.Y. 2009). 
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for sixty-five days, a far more substantial time than the twenty-plus days 
in Jackson.114  Unlike the Jackson court, however, the Weaver court did 
rely on federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, in addition to state 
law protections.115  The court outlined the precedent in Katz and, more 
specifically, Knotts, but was quick to explain that Knotts was not 
completely analogous to the case before it because one could not deny 
“more than a quarter of a century later,” that a beeper is “a very 
primitive tracking device” compared to GPS.116  The court also noted 
that Knotts involved the single trip of a container of chloroform, as 
opposed to the GPS monitoring in the case at hand, which monitored all 
trips within a 65-day period.117  Moreover, the court related that the 
“dragnet-style” monitoring that the Knotts court had reserved judgment 
on had finally arrived, and that “GPS technology, even in its present 
state of evolution, quite simply and matter-of-factly forces the issue.”118  
Additionally, the court addressed the Kyllo extrasensory versus sense-
augmenting dichotomy,119 stating that “GPS is not a mere enhancement 
of human sensory capacity, it facilitates a new technological perception 
of the world in which the situation of any object may be followed and 
exhaustively recorded over, in most cases, a practically unlimited 
period.”120 
Addressing the reasonable expectation of privacy that people have 
in their day-to-day movements in their automobiles, the court was 
unwilling to cede that there had been “any dramatic diminution in the 
socially reasonable expectation that our communications and 
transactions will remain to a large extent private.”121  The court 
acknowledged that there were in fact diminished expectations, but not 
to the point that “we effectively consent to the unsupervised disclosure 
to law enforcement authorities of all that GPS technology can and will 
reveal.”122  Thus, the court was unwilling to find that a person’s 
                                                 
114. Id. at 1195; Jackson, 76 P.3d at 220–21. 
115. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1197 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478–79 
(1928)). 
116. Id. at 1198–99. 
117. Id. at 1199. 
118. Id. at 1200.  
119. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
120. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199. 
121. Id. at 1200. 
122. Id. 
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reasonable expectation of privacy has been so diminished by technology 
that surreptitious use of GPS tracking devices raised no constitutional 
issue at all.123  Similar to the Jackson court, the court in Weaver stressed 
that the amount of information that GPS could provide about an 
individual (especially over the course of sixty-five days) would be of 
“breathtaking quality and quantity” and, inferentially, would be a large 
invasion of privacy.124  In conclusion, the court held that use of GPS to 
track an individual was a search under the Fourth Amendment.125  The 
court did offer one caveat, noting that technological advances can serve 
to help law enforcement, but it indicated that “[w]ithout judicial 
oversight, the use of these powerful devices presents a significant and, to 
our minds, unacceptable risk of abuse.”126 
Not all state courts, however, have found GPS tracking 
impermissible.127  In Foltz v. Commonwealth, for example, the court held 
that GPS tracking of a sexual offender in his company van for ten days 
was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.128  As in Weaver, the 
court addressed the Kyllo dichotomy, articulating that use of GPS was 
merely sense-augmenting, and enabled the police to “technologically 
supplement . . . information which the police could have obtained by 
their own sensory perception.”129  Thus, the court saw the facts as merely 
a Knotts analogue, albeit using more advanced technology, and 
therefore asserted that GPS monitoring fell within the existing Fourth 
Amendment framework.130  The court also noted in a footnote that the 
case could be distinguished from Maynard because Maynard involved 
more than a month of monitoring, whereas in Foltz it was merely ten 
                                                 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 1199–200. 
125. Id. at 1202. 
126. Id. at 1203. 
127. Foltz v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281 (Va. Ct. App. 2010); see also Osburn v. 
State, 44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002) (“[T]he attachment of the electronic tracking device to the 
bumper of [the defendant’s] vehicle did not constitute an unreasonable search or seizure 
under the Nevada Constitution.”); State v. Sveum, 769 N.W.2d 53, 60 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) 
(“[N]o Fourth Amendment search or seizure occurs when police attach a GPS device to the 
outside of a vehicle while it is in a place accessible to the public and then use that device to 
track the vehicle while it is in public view.”). 
128. Foltz, 698 S.E.2d at 292. 
129. Id. at 291. 
130. Id. (“We find that this advancement in tracking technology provides an insufficient 
basis for distinguishing Knotts.”). 
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days.131  The court more convincingly distinguished this case from 
Maynard by explaining that the cases differed fundamentally in the 
amount and type of monitoring done: In Maynard, authorities 
monitored the defendant’s personal vehicle over the course of a month, 
which would show all of the places he had been; in Foltz, the defendant 
was only being monitored while on the job, since the GPS device was 
affixed to his work van.132  This more limited use of monitoring (in terms 
of time and of scope) appears to have convinced the court that the 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy had not been violated.133  
This distinction from Maynard is arguably significant because one’s 
actions at work are fundamentally more “public” (depending on the 
job); consequently, if one is subject to employer supervision, invasion by 
law enforcement could be construed as less offensive. 
It remains clear that without federal guidance, state court decisions 
will continue to be disparate and unsettled; without a constitutional 
floor, an individual’s movements in an automobile will be protected only 
to the extent that states are willing to find that people have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in those movements by using Fourth Amendment 
analogues within state constitutions. 
B.  The First Federal Appellate Interpretations—Garcia and Marquez 
The first elaborate analysis of GPS tracking relating to Fourth 
Amendment searches occurred in United States v. Garcia, an opinion 
authored by Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit.134  In Garcia, the 
defendant challenged the use of a GPS tracker that was placed on his 
automobile without a warrant and eventually revealed his travels to a 
large tract of land used to manufacture methamphetamines.135  Judge 
Posner began by stating that using GPS was functionally equivalent to 
using cameras or satellite imaging, and that if those methods of 
                                                 
131. Id. at 291 n.12.  For a discussion of the Maynard court’s holding and rationale, see 
infra Part IV. 
132. Foltz, 698 S.E.2d at 291 n.12; see also infra Part IV. 
133. Foltz, 698 S.E.2d at 291 n.12; see also infra Part IV. 
134. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 883 
(2007).  However, Garcia was not the first federal court of appeals case to address GPS 
monitoring.  See United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999). 
135. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 995; see also Ryan J. Foley, Police Use GPS to Track Suspects 
Despite Murky Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 25, 2009, available at 
http://www.pantagraph.com/news/article_74ee4137-bf8c-56ea-925f-89e26eb4e4a8.html. 
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surveillance are not a search under the Fourth Amendment, neither is 
the use of GPS.136  But, he conceded that this could not be the end of the 
argument because “the meaning of a Fourth Amendment search must 
change to keep pace with the march of science.”137  Judge Posner then 
postulated that GPS tracking devices could be used in a more 
widespread “wholesale surveillance” application by the government, 
and that it would be “premature to rule that such a program of mass 
surveillance could not possibly raise a question under the Fourth 
Amendment.”138  He noted the need for the police to continue to be 
efficient in the twenty-first century by using more advanced devices and 
that doing so involves the traditional “tradeoff between security and 
privacy.”139  In conclusion, he stated, pragmatically, Chief Justice 
Warren’s warning in Lopez v. United States that “‘the fantastic advances 
in the field of electronic communication constitute a great danger to the 
privacy of the individual’” and that the court has a responsibility to 
supervise the “‘indiscriminate use of such devices.’”140  The court 
ultimately held that use of GPS tracking was no more offensive to 
Fourth Amendment rights than the use of cameras or satellite 
imagery.141  Notably, Judge Posner’s continual forward thinking 
                                                 
136. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 998. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963)). 
141. Id. at 997.  This holding was upheld in United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272 
(7th Cir. 2011).  However, reminiscent of Judge Kozinski’s dissent in Pineda-Moreno, Justice 
Diane Wood also wrote a forceful dissent, stating, inter alia, that  
 
 To conclude that open-ended, real-time GPS surveillance is not a ‘search’ 
invites an unprecedented level of government intrusion into every person’s private 
life.  The government could, without any metric of suspicion, monitor the 
whereabouts of any person without constitutional constraint.  Under the majority’s 
view, such surveillance is tolerable.  And because the Fourth Amendment protects 
individual rights, it is not clear why the use of GPS technology for mass surveillance 
would trigger the warrant requirement if the suspicionless surveillance of an 
individual does not. Thus, not only is the indefinite GPS surveillance of a single 
person permissible; the government could also keep tabs on entire communities, 
perhaps with the hope of identifying hints of criminal conduct.  Under the majority’s 
framework, GPS tracking of all cars in a high-crime area is as unremarkable as an 
officer on the beat posing a polite question to a local resident.  All of this can occur 
solely at the whim of a governmental actor, and there would be no requirement to 
demonstrate any suspicion of wrongdoing to a neutral magistrate. 
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provided a warning that “[s]hould government someday decide to 
institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will 
be time enough to decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be 
interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search.”142  While Judge 
Posner’s belief that that time has not arrived is debatable, his decision is 
unequivocally qualified by “draw[ing] a line between technological 
‘capability’ and ‘reality.’”143 
At least one commentator has attempted to distinguish Garcia from 
other state and federal cases because law enforcement in Garcia used a 
memory-tracking unit that did not provide real-time information about 
the defendant’s whereabouts but had to be downloaded at a later time.144  
While it is unclear whether this distinction in what type of GPS 
technology was used colored Judge Posner’s opinion, it is irrelevant if it 
did so145 because the intrusiveness of GPS tracking is not related, per se, 
to when the information is reviewed, but instead is related to the 
amount and type of information that the GPS tracking reveals.146 
The Eighth Circuit addressed a similar case in United States v. 
Marquez, holding that the defendant lacked standing to challenge GPS 
tracking on an automobile he was in, but that even if he had standing, 
                                                                                                                     
Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d at 294 (Wood, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
142. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998. 
143. See Jallad, supra note 69, at 372–73. 
144. See Koppel, supra note 98, at 1078–79.  The Seventh Circuit recently rejected this 
argument in United States v. Cuevas-Perez, holding that the court was not persuaded “that 
real-time revelation of location (although additional to the information provided in Garcia) 
necessarily serves the impermissible ends of the extensive GPS surveillance at issue in 
Maynard.”  640 F.3d 272, 275 (7th Cir. 2011).  At least one state court has also found this 
distinction unpersuasive.  See State v. Brereton, 2011 WI App 127, ¶ 15, 337 Wis. 2d 145, 804 
N.W.2d 243 (“[W]e see no reason to find that the police overstepped their bounds simply 
because they were able to monitor the movements in real time rather than needing to 
continually return to the car, remove the device, and download its information to a 
computer.”). 
145. To make Fourth Amendment jurisprudence turn on this distinction would be a 
move in the wrong direction.  Judge Bell in United States v. Walker forecloses this GPS 
technology distinction in a notable way: “That the officers here chose to use a specifically 
engineered GPS tracking device rather than merely duct-taping an iPhone to Defendant’s 
bumper is of little moment.  The technology in this case is in general use . . . .”  771 F. Supp. 
2d 803, 811 (W.D. Mich. 2011). 
146. See Hutchins, supra note 35, at 457 (“[A]pplication of the general rules governing 
qualitative categories of technology are moderated by consideration of the quantity or 
specificity of information revealed.  In other words, as with other forms of enhanced 
surveillance, after GPS-enabled technology is qualitatively classified, the question of 
constitutional protection turns on the quantity of information revealed by the surveillance.”). 
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the GPS tracking was nevertheless permissible.147  In Marquez, the facts 
insinuate that a GPS tracker was used over the course of many months 
to track the defendant’s whereabouts to gather evidence about a drug 
ring.148  The defendant was a passenger in the automobile that was 
tracked, but he neither owned nor drove the automobile.149  The court 
addressed the GPS tracking in dicta; it noted the precedent provided by 
Knotts and elucidated that “when police have reasonable suspicion . . . 
[that a particular vehicle is or will be used in the commission of a crime] 
. . . a warrant is not required when, while the vehicle is parked in a 
public place, they install a non-invasive GPS tracking device on it for a 
reasonable period of time.”150  The court did not provide, however, any 
reasoning as to what constitutes a reasonable amount of time.151 
Like the court in Garcia, the court in Marquez indicated that the 
“‘wholesale surveillance’” scenario from Garcia would similarly change 
the way the court interpreted a case with facts of that nature and the 
court might not find such surveillance permissible; however, the court 
concluded that the surveillance before it was not of that type, and thus 
such postulating had no bearing on the holding.152  The court did suggest 
that GPS tracking was merely sense-augmenting, stating that “[t]he 
device merely allowed the police to reduce the cost of lawful 
surveillance.”153  In some respects, Marquez widened the scope of Garcia 
because, in Marquez, the surveillance occurred over a long period of 
time, and the court was willing to adopt the Knotts holding that anything 
that occurs in public in an automobile is without a subjective 
expectation of privacy.154  However, because the court in Marquez found 
the defendant had no standing, and the relevant portions are in dicta, it 
is only minimally informative.155 
C.  GPS Tracking in the Forefront—The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation in 
                                                 
147. United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010). 
148. Id. at 607.  It is unclear exactly how long the GPS tracker was in place based on the 
decision; however, it was placed in May and removed in October, id., so the assumption is 
more than a few months. 
149. Id. at 609. 
150. Id. at 610. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 609–10. 
155. Id. at 609. 
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Pineda-Moreno 
The most publicized case involving GPS tracking is United States v. 
Pineda-Moreno.156  In Pineda-Moreno, the defendant moved to suppress 
evidence obtained from GPS tracking, arguing that the evidence 
obtained violated his Fourth Amendment rights.157  The defendant was 
suspected of being part of a drug ring and was monitored with “various 
types of mobile tracking devices” over the course of a four-month 
period.158  The defendant asserted, inter alia, that use of the tracking 
devices to continuously monitor him subverted Kyllo’s holding that 
usage of sense-enhancing devices is a search unless the device is in 
public use.159  There is no indication that the defendant asserted a more 
general reasonable expectation of privacy claim against the four-month 
tracking of his movements.160  Instead, the defendant’s main contention 
was that Knotts should therefore not control because the Supreme Court 
had “heavily modified the Fourth Amendment analysis applicable to 
such technological devices in Kyllo.”161  However, the court found this 
contention misguided, relating that a “search” does not occur every time 
officers use “sense-enhancing technology not available to the general 
public.”162  Moreover, the court stated that the use of GPS in this case 
was equivalent to following an automobile on a public street, something 
that is “unequivocally not a search within the meaning of the [Fourth 
A]mendment.”163  After dismissing the defendant’s claim under Kyllo, 
the court then neatly fit the situation within Knotts, stating that 
                                                 
156. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc 
denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, No. 10-7515 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010). 
157. Id. at 1214. 
158. Id. at 1213. 
159. Id. at 1216.  His contention, as noted by the court, misstates Kyllo’s precedent.  Id.  
Pineda-Moreno also asserted that his reasonable expectation of privacy was violated by 
installation of the device in public areas and in his curtilage (in this case, his driveway).  Id. at 
1214–15.  The court’s holding that an officer may enter the curtilage to install such a device 
caused a large amount of contention nationally, as well.  Id. at 1215; see also Matt Buchanan, 
Our Worst Nightmares About the Government Tracking Us Just Came True, GIZMODO (Aug. 
26, 2010), http://gizmodo.com/5622800/our-worst-nightmares-about-the-government-tracking-
us-just-came-true (discussing the court of appeals’ decision upholding the lower court; the 
appellate decision was more highly publicized). 
160. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1212. 
161. Id. at 1216. 
162. Id.  The court refers to GPS as sense-enhancing; however, it is arguably extra-
sensory. 
163. Id. (quoting United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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“‘[i]nsofar as [Pineda-Moreno’s] complaint appears to be simply that 
scientific devices such as [tracking devices] enabled the police to be 
more effective in detecting crime, it simply has no constitutional 
foundation.  We have never equated police efficiency with 
unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so now.’”164 
Thus, the Pineda-Moreno court was able to dismiss any argument of 
an invasion of privacy by leveraging Knotts’ assertion of no privacy in 
public automotive movements, and impliedly using Kyllo’s quasi-
formulaic distinction between sense-augmenting and extrasensory 
devices.165  The court’s explanation, in essence, stated that “[t]echnology 
did not . . . alter what was already in the public domain,” a holding not 
unlike the holding in Knotts.166 
After the decision was handed down, the defendant appealed for a 
rehearing en banc, which was denied.167  Chief Judge Kozinski (joined by 
others) wrote a stirring dissent to this denial, which touched on many of 
the issues that the original decision ignored.168  Judge Kozinski discussed, 
inter alia, the overlooked issue regarding the constant monitoring of a 
person’s movements over an elongated course of time.169  Judge Kozinski 
ascribed to the notion also mentioned in Weaver that “[t]he electronic 
tracking devices used by the police in this case have little in common 
with the primitive devices in Knotts.”170  Like the court in Weaver, Judge 
Kozinski also asserted that Knotts could be distinguished from the 
present case because tracking one container of chloroform with a beeper 
is not equivalent to using “GPS satellites to pinpoint the car’s location 
on a continuing basis,” without the need for an officer’s intervention 
                                                 
164. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983)).  Other courts have discounted or found irrelevant the 
difference in technology between a beeper and GPS.  See, e.g., United States v. Narrl, 789 F. 
Supp. 2d 645, 652 (D.S.C. 2011) (“Knotts was not limited to any particular technology . . . .”). 
165. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); see supra text accompanying note 
36. 
166. See Jallad, supra note 69, at 370. 
167. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for 
cert. filed, No. 10-7515 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010). 
168. Id. at 1121–26 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
169. Id. at 1123–24. 
170. Id. at 1124; see also People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“Knotts 
involved the use of what we must now, more than a quarter of a century later, recognize to 
have been a very primitive tracking device.”). 
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(except to download or monitor the information).171  Judge Kozinski 
further argued that GPS tracking, along with other new technologies, is 
not sense-augmenting, but extrasensory because of the sophisticated 
information that it can provide.172  Insinuating an Orwellian society, 
Judge Kozinski asserted that “[b]y holding that this kind of surveillance 
doesn’t impair an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the 
panel hands the government the power to track the movements of every 
one of us, every day of our lives.”173  While that statement is arguably 
melodramatic, it in essence states what Weaver and Jackson attempted 
to imply.174 
Finally, after reviewing other technologies that are “advance ripples 
to a tidal wave of technological assaults on our privacy,” Judge Kozinski 
returned to the inferential leap one must make from Knotts to Pineda-
Moreno;175 namely, that what Knotts held—that one has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in her public travels, because visual surveillance 
(or enhanced versions of it) could see you—is a far cry from the inability 
to “hid[e] from the all-seeing network of GPS satellites that hover 
overhead, which never sleep, never blink, never get confused and never 
lose attention.”176  He also forwarded the less convincing argument that 
a guilty person would not know to disguise his or her movements 
because “they’ll have no reason to suspect that Big Brother is watching 
them.”177  In closing, Judge Kozinski asserted that society has reached 
the time that Knotts foretold—where dragnet-style surveillance is 
possible—and that “[t]his is precisely the wrong time for a court 
covering one-fifth of the country’s population to say that the Fourth 
Amendment has no role to play in mediating the voracious appetites of 
                                                 
171. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1124; Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199. 
172. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1124 (“The modern devices used in [the defendant’s] 
case can record the car’s movements without human intervention.”). 
173. Id. 
174. Both Weaver and Jackson lamented the large amount of potentially intimate 
information that could be obtained about an individual, for an extended duration—there is 
not a large inferential step from there to constant government monitoring.  Weaver, 909 
N.E.2d at 1199; State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003); see also Hutchins, supra note 
35, at 459 (noting that if GPS tracking isn’t a search, “the government will be entitled to check 
whether we spend our lunch hour at the gym, at the temple, or at the strip club”). 
175. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1125. 
176. Id. at 1125–26. 
177. Id. at 1126. 
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law enforcement.”178  In the wake of Judge Kozinski’s stirring dissent 
was a growing awareness of the implications of GPS tracking within the 
public.179  If the reasonable expectation of privacy is a function of 
societal expectations, then arguments here and in Maynard will certainly 
affect the public opinion when the Supreme Court decides this issue.180 
IV.  A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FEDERAL INTERPRETATION—
UNITED STATES V. MAYNARD 
Handed down six days prior to the Ninth Circuit’s denial of 
rehearing en banc in Pineda-Moreno, the Maynard decision furthered a 
novel approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by injecting 
“mosaic theory,” a theory typically reserved for Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) and national security cases, to counter what some argue is 
constantly eroding privacy due to technological innovation.181  The 
opinion by Judge Ginsburg flew in the face of Pineda-Moreno, and 
reignited the ongoing privacy debate with regard to GPS.182 
In Maynard, the defendant Jones’s Jeep was outfitted with a GPS 
device that was installed without a warrant and his movements were 
                                                 
178. Id. 
179. See Cohen, supra note 12; Editorial, Supreme Court, Congress Need New Rules for 
GPS Searches, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 2, 2010, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_ 
opinion/editorials/articles/2010/09/02/supreme_court_congress_need_new_rules_for_gps_sear
ches; Whitehead, supra note 12. 
180. See generally United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g 
denied en banc sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 671 (2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), 
and aff’d on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations 
and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843 (2002). 
181. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.  See generally Recent Case, United States v. Maynard, 
615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-0304, 2010 WL 4703743 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 
19, 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-7102, 2010 WL 4156203 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2010), 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 827 (2011); Editorial, An Illegal Search, by GPS, NY TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at A30; Orin 
Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces “Mosaic Theory” of Fourth Amendment, Holds GPS 
Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010), 
http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-hold
s-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search/ [hereinafter Kerr, D.C. Circuit] (noting that 
Maynard is unpersuasive because “it ignores and misrepresents a wide range of Fourth 
Amendment cases and principles”); Julian Sanchez, GPS Tracking and a Mosaic Theory of 
Government Searches, CATO @ LIBERTY (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/gps-
tracking-and-a-mosaic-theory-of-government-searches/.  
182. See Kerr, D.C. Circuit, supra note 181. 
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tracked twenty-four hours a day for four weeks.183  Jones argued that 
evidence gained from the GPS tracking was improperly admitted 
because the tracking constituted an unreasonable search under the 
Fourth Amendment.184  The government, consistent with its position in 
previous cases, contended that this case fell squarely within the Knotts 
holding, and thus the defendant’s Fourth Amendment argument could 
be dismissed because Jones’s movements were on public thoroughfares 
where no reasonable expectation of privacy exists.185  The court rejected 
the government’s contention, pointing to the Supreme Court’s decision 
to reserve judgment on the “dragnet” question in Knotts, and relaying 
that in Knotts, the Court did not hold that a person “has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements whatsoever, world without end, 
as the Government would have it.”186  The court then used this 
distinction—that some reasonable expectation of privacy is carved out 
even when traveling in public in an automobile—to distinguish this case 
from Garcia and Pineda-Moreno.187  The distinguishing element here, 
the court explained, was that Jones actually argued that prolonged 
monitoring was a search falling outside of Knotts; this granular 
distinction is fundamentally important because the defendants in Garcia 
and Pineda-Moreno conceded that Knotts was controlling, essentially 
foreclosing the “dragnet” argument, allowing the Garcia and Pineda-
Moreno courts to continue to leave for another day “whether 
‘wholesale’ or ‘mass’ electronic surveillance . . . requires a warrant.”188  
Moreover, the court reinforced that Knotts did not apply to the facts 
before it, because law enforcement tracked Jones’s “movements 24 
hours a day for 28 days as he moved among scores of places, thereby 
discovering the totality and pattern of his movements from place to 
                                                 
183. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 556; see also United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007).  Subsequent to Maynard, many courts have 
found that GPS monitoring still falls under Knotts.  See, e.g., United States v. Sparks, 750 F. 
Supp. 2d 384, 392 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that use of GPS to catch bank robbers within the 
same day fell within Knotts and the Maynard “synergism” was unconvincing).  However, 
Sparks is likely distinguishable from Maynard in that the monitoring in Sparks occurred over 
one single day, whereas the defendant in Maynard was tracked for a month.  Id.; Maynard, 
615 F.3d at 555. 
186. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557. 
187. Id. at 557–58. 
188. Id. 
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place to place.”189 
However, resolution of whether Knotts applied was not the end of 
the case—the defendant still needed to prove that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and that “depends in large part upon whether 
that expectation relates to information that has been ‘expose[d] to the 
public.’”190  This inquiry focuses on both actual exposure and 
constructive exposure.191 
Addressing actual exposure, the court stated that when considering 
whether something is actually exposed to the public, one must ask “not 
what another person can physically and may lawfully do but rather what 
a reasonable person expects another might actually do.”192  The court 
then rejected the argument that all of Jones’s travels were actually 
exposed to the public because it would be highly unlikely that a stranger 
would observe all of another’s movements over the course of a month.193  
The court explained that 
 
[i]t is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow 
someone during a single journey as he goes to the market or 
returns home from work.  It is another thing entirely for that 
stranger to pick up the scent again the next day and the day after 
that, week in and week out, dogging his prey until he has 
                                                 
189. Id. at 558.  However, post-Maynard, at least one court has found that tracking for 
an even longer time than twenty-eight days still does not constitute dragnet-type surveillance, 
and that Knotts still applies.  See United States v. Walker, 771 F. Supp. 2d 803, 811, 817 n.2 
(W.D. Mich. 2011). 
190. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
191. Id. at 558. 
192. Id. at 559 (emphasis added). 
193. Id. at 560 (“[W]e hold the whole of a person’s movements over the course of a 
month is not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood a stranger would observe 
all of those movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil.”).  The Maynard court’s 
probabilistic approach to the Fourth Amendment, here, derives from one of the many ways 
that the Supreme Court has approached Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  See Kerr, Four 
Models, supra note 57, at 508–12 (“Under the probabilistic approach, a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when the odds are very high that others will not 
successfully pry into his affairs.”).  This probabilistic argument is taken even further in Jones’s 
brief to the Supreme Court, even reinvoking property rights along with it.  See Brief for 
Respondent at 11, 28–29, supra note 89.  The respondents argued that Jones did have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy because, while GPS tracking devices are available to the 
public, it would be unlawful for another person to attach it to Jones’s car, and thus Jones 
would not reasonably expect it to happen—i.e., not probable.  Id. at 20.  The Jones Court 
adopted this property rights approach.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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identified all the places, people, amusements, and chores that 
make up that person’s hitherto private routine.194 
 
Moving on to constructive exposure, the court addressed the veiled 
and more technical issue of whether all of Jones’s movements were 
“constructively exposed because each of his individual movements 
during that time was itself in public view.”195  Therefore, even though no 
one might have actually seen all that he did, the mere fact that 
everything was public would have been sufficient to defeat his 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  The government did not raise this 
issue, but the court explained that it was important to address it.  To do 
so, the court borrowed from national security and FOIA cases and 
analyzed the use from a data aggregation standpoint or “mosaic 
theory.”196  One commentator has described mosaic theory as the notion 
that 
 
[d]isparate items of information, though individually of limited 
or no utility to their possessor, can take on added significance 
when combined with other items of information.  Combining the 
items illuminates their interrelationships and breeds analytic 
synergies, so that the resulting mosaic of information is worth 
more than the sum of its parts.197 
 
Mosaic theory or “compilation” has also been defined more 
succinctly in national security applications as “‘the concept that 
apparently harmless pieces of information when assembled together 
could reveal a damaging picture.’”198  Applying this concept to a Fourth 
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy case was wholly novel.199  
                                                 
194. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560. 
195. Id. at 560–61. 
196. Id. at 561–62. 
197. David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of 
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630 (2005). 
198. Id. (quoting 32 C.F.R. § 701.31 (2005)).  For a larger discussion of mosaic theory as 
it relates to FOIA and national security, see Pozen, supra note 197. 
199. See Kerr, D.C. Circuit, supra note 181 (“Maynard introduces a novel theory of the 
Fourth Amendment: That whether government conduct is a search is measured not by 
whether a particular individual act is a search, but rather whether an entire course of conduct, 
viewed collectively, amounts to a search.”).  This approach has not been without its criticisms.  
See generally id.; United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., 
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In its analysis, the Maynard court first looked to United States 
Department of Justice v. National Reporters Committee, a FOIA case in 
which a CBS correspondent and others had requested the FBI rap sheet 
of a member of the Medico crime family; the reporter had requested 
under FOIA those parts of the rap sheet that were of public record.200  
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, said that although the 
information in the rap sheet had previously been disclosed to the public, 
a person’s privacy interest in that information did not “approach zero,” 
and thus, the Supreme Court rejected the “respondents’ cramped notion 
of personal privacy.”201  The Supreme Court went further and noted the 
distinction between “scattered disclosure of the bits of information 
contained in a rap sheet and revelation of the rap sheet as a whole.”202  
The Supreme Court went on to hold that disclosure would implicate 
Fourth Amendment concerns and “could reasonably be expected to 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”203 
Building upon the distinction between the whole and the sum of its 
parts, the Maynard court then drew precedent from Smith v. Maryland, 
a Fourth Amendment case having to do with pen registers.204  The 
Maynard court found it telling that if  
 
the privacy interest in a whole could be no greater (or no 
different) than the privacy interest in its constituent parts, then 
the Supreme Court would have had no reason to consider at 
length whether . . . a reasonable expectation of privacy [exists] in 
the list of numbers [one calls].205   
 
                                                                                                                     
dissenting) (stating that the panel’s decision was “inconsistent not only with every other 
federal circuit which has considered the case, but more importantly, with controlling Supreme 
Court precedent set forth in United States v. Knotts” (internal citation omitted)), denying cert. 
to United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. United 
States v. Maynard, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010), and cert. granted, United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 
3064 (2011), aff’d on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
200. United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 
U.S. 749, 757 (1989). 
201. Id. at 762–63. 
202. Id. at 764. 
203. Id. at 770–71. 
204. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  A pen register is 
a device used to record the numbers a person dials from their phone.  Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
205. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561. 
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The court more specifically pointed to Justice Stewart’s dissent in 
Smith, where he stated that a reasonable expectation of privacy should 
exist in the list of calls one makes because “such a list . . . could reveal 
the identities of the persons and places called, and thus reveal the most 
intimate details of a person’s life.”206  Explicit within this reference to the 
intimate details of one’s life is Jones’s argument to the court that GPS 
data essentially reveals the same thing when aggregated.  Justice 
Marshall, dissenting in Smith as well, went further in his criticism of the 
call list, referring to it as an “‘extensive [intrusion],’” that can 
“‘significantly jeopardize [individuals’] sense of security’” and stating 
that such methods thus require “‘more than self-restraint by law 
enforcement officials.’”207  While not mentioned by the Maynard court, 
Justice Marshall’s call for restraint when dealing with extensive privacy 
intrusions resonates similarly today with GPS use. 
Upon this foundation that the Fourth Amendment implicates a 
distinction between the whole and the sum of its parts, the court 
described the whole of Jones’s movements over the course of a month as 
not constructively exposed because, “like a rap sheet, that whole reveals 
far more than the individual movements it comprises.”208  And appealing 
to a true “mosaic theory” case from a national security perspective, the 
court stated that “‘[w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed, may 
appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene.’”209  
This statement encapsulates the notion that “even though an individual 
knows some attention from others is likely [in public], the level of 
scrutiny the person expects and risks merely by being in public is not the 
kind of highly individualized, targeted scrutiny imparted by law 
enforcement.”210  Moreover, as the Jackson and Weaver courts did, the 
                                                 
206. Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
207. Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 
786 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
208. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562. 
209. Id. (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985)).  Sims was a case concerning 
intelligence sources and focused on the assemblage of data from disparate sources giving rise 
to national security concerns.  Sims, 471 U.S. at 178 (“[T]he very nature of the intelligence 
apparatus of any country is to try and find out the concerns of others; bits and pieces of data 
‘may aid in piecing together bits of other information even when the individual piece is not of 
obvious importance in itself.’” (internal citation omitted)). 
210. Otterberg, supra note 81, at 686; see also Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–
39 (2000) (holding that manipulation of a bus passenger’s carry-on bag, above simple 
observation, is a search). 
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court then elaborated on just how much information could be revealed 
by tracking an individual’s movements over the course of a month.211  
Finally, to bolster its constructive exposure analysis, the court pointed to 
common law privacy tort violations where prolonged surveillance had 
been found actionable and to state court GPS tracking cases where such 
practices have been found to reveal an intimate portrait of one’s life, 
violating a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.212 
Closing out the Maynard court’s decision was an analysis of the 
second part of the Katz test—whether Jones’s expectation of privacy 
was an expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable—and 
one that has “‘a source outside the Fourth Amendment,’ such as 
‘understandings that are recognized or permitted by society.’”213  To 
begin, the court restated that not everything that one does in public has 
no constitutional protection, but that one continues to have a “zone” of 
privacy outside of the home.214  The court then noted that there can be 
no question that prolonged GPS tracking is something society is 
prepared to recognize as a violation of an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy because this type of intrusion “stands in stark 
contrast to the relatively brief intrusion at issue in Knotts; indeed it 
exceeds the intrusions occasioned by every police practice the Supreme 
Court has deemed a search under Katz.”215  The court then pointed to 
“nationwide ‘societal understandings’” of GPS monitoring’s privacy 
implications by looking at state law restrictions on the use of GPS 
tracking and state court holdings that GPS tracking is a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment (or state constitutions).216  Finally, and in lieu of 
creating precedent even more in conflict with other federal circuits, the 
court distinguished prolonged visual surveillance from its holding, 
stating that “just as the Supreme Court in Knotts reserved the lawfulness 
of prolonged beeper surveillance, we reserve the lawfulness of 
                                                 
211. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
212. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562–63. 
213. Id. at 563 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 n.22 (1984)); see 
also Hutchins, supra note 35, at 428 (“A personal desire for privacy, no matter how earnestly 
held, does not trigger Fourth Amendment protection unless the desire is one that society is 
prepared to embrace as reasonable.”). 
214. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 564. 
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prolonged visual surveillance.”217 
V.  WHY THE MAYNARD COURT IS MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 
A.  The Need for Change 
The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he judiciary risks error by 
elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of 
emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.”218  
However, it is hard to argue that GPS’s role within society is muddled at 
this point considering its use within the military, the citizenry, and by 
law enforcement.219  GPS is now installed in nearly all new cellphones 
and is a feature available in automobiles with OnStar.220  There has also 
been a substantial upward trend in its use as a stand-alone device for 
travel assistance.221  Its widespread use cannot be understated, and this 
prevalence has been noted by many of the courts that have been faced 
with GPS tracking Fourth Amendment questions.222  More alarmingly, 
                                                 
217. Id. at 566.  The reservation of the visual surveillance issue was one focal point when 
the case went up for rehearing.  United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(Sentelle, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the court’s aggregation approach provides no 
distinction “between the supposed invasion by aggregation of data [by] GPS-augmented 
surveillance and . . . purely visual surveillance of substantial length”), cert. granted, United 
States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), aff’d on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
218. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010). 
219. See Buchok, supra note 27, at 1019–26.  GPS is also the legislated method of choice 
for tracking sex offenders, for life, in a multitude of states, including California.  See, e.g., 
Sarah Shekhter, Note, Every Step You Take, They’ll Be Watching You: The Legal and 
Practical Implications of Lifetime GPS Monitoring of Sex Offenders, 38 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 1085, 1085–92 (2011). 
220. OnStar itself has become embroiled in a privacy-related GPS tracking issue.  See 
Kashmir Hill, GM’s Boneheaded Privacy Mistake with OnStar, FORBES (Sept. 26, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/09/26/gms-boneheaded-privacy-mistake-with-
onstar/ (reporting that OnStar indicated in a new privacy agreement that they would continue 
to track cars with the system installed, even after the owners had cancelled OnStar).  Senator 
Chuck Shumer called for an FTC investigation to the practice, saying “‘[b]y tracking drivers 
even after they’ve cancelled their service, OnStar is attempting one of the most brazen 
invasions of privacy in recent memory.’”  Sen. Charles Schumer, Schumer Calls on OnStar to 
Immediately Stop Tracking Former Customers and Refrain From Selling Drivers’ Data; Calls 
on FTC to Investigate, SENATE.GOV (Sept. 26, 2011), http://schumer.senate.gov/Newsroom/ 
record.cfm?id=334193. 
221. See Buchok, supra note 27, at 1026.  For a dystopian perspective on the 
pervasiveness of GPS technology (and how the government could potentially use it), see 
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1125 (2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting), 
petition for cert. filed, No. 10-7515 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010). 
222. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1126; United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th 
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GPS’s use within law enforcement appears to be growing.223  The risk we 
continually run by letting Knotts stand as nearly the only defining 
precedent governing GPS is that we are equating an antiquated 
technology (the beeper) with something massively more sophisticated 
and capable of gathering a larger amount of data.224  Thus, to reserve an 
opinion on GPS much longer is to “transform[] from mere assertion to 
self-fulfilling prophecy the government’s contention that people 
categorically lack any reasonable expectation of privacy” when it comes 
to not only GPS, but also other emerging and maybe not yet as 
prevalent technologies.225  While the Maynard decision has been 
criticized for using Knotts “as an escape hatch” to craft an entire new 
way to approach the GPS tracking problem,226 that escape was necessary 
to reinterpret Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in a manner that 
adequately addresses emerging technology. 
Maynard succeeds in addressing technology by viewing privacy not 
wholly within the constrained notions of the Fourth Amendment but 
                                                                                                                     
Cir. 2010) (noting, as observed in Garcia, that with respect to GPS, “the cost of the 
technology is decreasing while the ability of police to monitor and install such devices is 
increasing”); United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 392 (D. Mass. 2010) (“[W]ith the 
proliferation of private GPS use . . . it is unconvincing to argue that society is completely 
unaware of the power of these devices.”); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (N.Y. 
2009) (“GPS [is] becoming an increasingly routine feature in cars and cell phones.”).  
223. See Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 8, at 2 n.1 (“GPS 
tracking is an important law-enforcement tool. Investigative agents of the United States 
Department of Justice employ this method of surveillance with great frequency.”).  The 
government has also made clear that they believe they are not abusing GPS technology.  Brief 
for the United States at 14–15, United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (No 10-1259). 
224. See State v. White, 5th Dist. No. 2010-CA-60, 2011-Ohio-4526, at ¶ 49 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Sept. 1, 2011) (“The argument that [GPS devices] only augment[] that which can 
admittedly be done by visual surveillance is feckless.”); see also Hutchins, supra note 35, at 
453–54; Otterberg, supra note 81, at 694–95.  Ironically, the Fifth Circuit distinguished 
Maynard in a recent case involving GPS tracking in part by arguing that despite the tracking 
occurring over a cross-country trip, the GPS tracker that was used was apparently less 
sophisticated, and thus equated the GPS device with the beeper in Knotts.  United States v. 
Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216, 220–21 (5th Cir. 2011).   
225. In re App. of U.S. for Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 
736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 595 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Spencer, supra note 180, at 912–13 (“The 
privacy battle is to be won or lost not by theoretical argument about the nature of privacy, but 
by concrete action . . . .”). 
226. Kerr, D.C. Circuit, supra note 181 (“The [Maynard] opinion seems to use that 
‘dragnet’ section from Knotts as an escape hatch: And once it’s free, nothing from Knotts is 
relevant anymore.”).  See generally United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), aff’d on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012). 
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also allowing conceptions of privacy within other bodies of law to be 
instructive.227  The invocation of “mosaic theory” is no more novel than 
the concept that law enforcement cannot merely go on a fishing 
expedition, looking for evidence while impinging on privacy rights.228  
And the hard question left unanswered by the Ninth and Seventh 
Circuit interpretations is how long is too long before GPS tracking 
becomes offensive even to those courts?  Maynard has also been 
criticized as leaving too amorphous a precedent, leaving the 
reasonableness determination of GPS tracking (and of other 
technologies) and how it all fits into the “mosaic” up to the judiciary.229  
But this argument is untenable because it requires that we should 
forsake progress in lieu of judicial certainty, which is almost never 
attainable.230  Additionally, the issue with “solving” the GPS tracking 
problem by merely adopting the precedent established in Garcia and 
                                                 
227. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2038 
(2010) (“The Maynard opinion’s embrace of a coherent body of information privacy law was 
more complete than anything written since Warren and Brandeis’s time.”).  Strahilevitz goes 
on to say that 
 
 Maynard . . . does not take the position that reasonable expectations of privacy 
in tort law, FOIA, and other non-Fourth Amendment contexts are the same as 
those arising under the Fourth Amendment.  It only takes the position that such 
precedents are instructive, and can be used to get a handle on the Fourth 
Amendment issues presented by relatively novel technologies. 
Id. at 2041. 
228. See Wilkins, supra note 34, at 1129 (“Thus, [F]ourth [A]mendment protection does 
not depend solely upon a finding of a particular intrusion into a defined place to obtain 
specified information.  Rather, as Katz itself held, a ‘search’ occurs when government probing 
for information intrudes upon fundamental concepts of personal intimacy and privacy.”). 
229. See Kerr, D.C. Circuit, supra note 181.  The workability of Maynard was one of the 
key issues recently before the Court in United States v. Jones.  Compare Brief for the United 
States, supra note 223 (using the word “unworkable” four times in its brief), with Brief for 
Respondent at 45, supra note 89 (arguing that Maynard is workable, but even if it is not, “the 
answer is not to unleash unchecked government GPS monitoring and recording.  The answer 
is to hold that any GPS monitoring is a search.”).  However, in its decision the Court did not 
analyze the workability of the Maynard rule.  132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  Justice Sotomayor 
concurred and Justice Alito concurred in the judgment with three Justices joining.  Id. at 954 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Alito, 
while adopting the principles underpinning Maynard, only obliquely confronted the 
workability of the Maynard rule.  Id. at 962–64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice 
Sotomayor did not confront Maynard’s workability.  Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
230. See generally Kerr, Four Models, supra note 57 (positing why the Supreme Court 
cannot—or should not—develop a definition of or test for “reasonable expectation of 
privacy”). 
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Pineda-Moreno is that we still have not moved forward.231  Both 
decisions continue to adhere blindly to Knotts, holding fast to the 
blanket assertion that anything that is done in public is not subject to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.232  And, both Karo and Kyllo provide 
limited insight into this problem because they too continue to facilitate 
this “inside/out distinction,” where what one does inside is entitled to 
constitutional protection, but all else gives rise to no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.233 
As we continue to grapple with this distinction in constitutional 
coverage arising out of physical space, we will undoubtedly revisit the 
issue anew as a functionally equivalent problem erupts in cyberspace.234  
Moreover, as technology moves forward, we will trade pen registers,235 
flashlights,236 and phone taps237 for online surveillance, Radio Frequency 
Identification tags, and technologies that will abolish the physical 
inside/out distinction altogether.238  And finally, data aggregation and 
prolonged surveillance issues will rise in prevalence as sophisticated 
technology for doing such aggregation and analysis continues to 
advance.  It is inescapable that the framers could not have contemplated 
the type of technology that the Fourth Amendment must now grapple 
                                                 
231. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc 
denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, No. 10-7515 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010); 
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007). 
232. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).  Judge Flaum of the Seventh 
Circuit has held to this position as well, but noted that “[i]f the doctrine needs clarifying, 
tweaking, or an overhaul in light of technologies employed by law enforcement,” that should 
be done by the Supreme Court and is “above our pay grade.”  United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 
640 F.3d 272, 276 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring).  
233. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); United States v. Karo, 486 U.S. 705 
(1984).  Kerr asserts that “[t]he distinction between government surveillance outside and 
government surveillance inside is probably the foundational distinction in Fourth 
Amendment law.”  Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment, supra note 88, at 1010; see also 
Kerr, D.C. Circuit, supra note 181. 
234. See generally Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment, supra note 88. 
235. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
236. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1983) (holding that use of a flashlight to 
look at a darkened area was not a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
237. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
238. One concern regarding technology’s movement and privacy is that the Supreme 
Court’s pace is not progressing equally.  See Kerr, New Technologies, supra note 30, at 868–
69.  But see Solove, supra note 30, at 768–73 (noting that the judiciary, not the legislature, is 
better suited to keep up with technological advances). 
13-WEBB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  2:08 PM 
792 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:751 
 
with,239 nor could one argue that the Knotts Court possessed the 
foresight to portend where we (and technology) would be in 2012.240 
B.  A Framework to “Futur-ize” the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
and How Maynard Fits 
So where do we go from here?  First, and concededly, the judiciary 
cannot and should not react to every changing aspect in the landscape of 
technology.  When confronted with these problems after they have 
properly matured, as is the case with GPS surveillance, courts must in 
some way fashion their decision normatively.241  Societal expectations of 
privacy are driven by not only the social atmosphere and practices with 
regard to a technology but also how the judiciary speaks on that issue.242  
Commentators and the general populace continue to lament the erosion 
of privacy as technology marches forward.243  These notions cannot 
merely be informative, but must drive the way in which the judiciary 
crafts remedies to this erosion. 
The Maynard court squarely addressed the normative issue by 
attempting to divine “nationwide ‘societal understandings’” through 
analysis of statutory regulation of GPS in the states as well as “the 
considered judgments of every court to which the issue has been 
                                                 
239. See Hutchins, supra note 35, at 430 (noting new technology is not something the 
Framers could have envisioned); see also SLOBOGIN, supra note 22, at 205 (arguing that 
“Supreme Court case law construing the Fourth Amendment, broadly read, allows 
government agents to . . . continuously track our public movements with cameras and beepers 
. . . at their discretion.  It is inconceivable that the drafters of the Constitution meant 
government to have such uncabined power.  If that is the import of its decisions, the Supreme 
Court has done this country a vast disservice.”). 
240. For example, Knotts was decided in 1983.  United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 
(1983).  GPS technology was not made available to the public at large until 1996, by order of 
President Bill Clinton.  Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-6 (March 28, 1996); see also 
United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 290 (7th Cir. 2011) (Wood, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the GPS device used in that case is “a device whose capabilities are so far beyond 
anything the Court saw in Knotts that we have difference in kind, not just a difference in 
degree”). 
241. See Solove, supra note 17, at 1142 (“Without a normative component, a conception 
of privacy can only provide a status report on existing privacy norms rather than guide us 
toward shaping privacy law and policy in the future.”).  See generally Spencer, supra note 180 
(examining how the predominate framework of privacy law promotes the disintegration of 
privacy). 
242. Spencer, supra note 180, at 850–51. 
243. Id. at 873–78. 
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squarely presented.”244  While these two sources are not fully 
representative of societal norms, they do at least embody some 
inclination of how representative government has legislated on the issue, 
and how state courts have wrestled with the problem.245  Additionally, it 
is hard to argue that privacy norms are not shifting, based on the recent 
proposal of federal legislation to protect against unwarranted GPS 
tracking,246 the unrelated-but-germane public outcry that occurred when 
people realized that their cell phone operating system was keeping a 
record of everywhere they went via GPS (a concept more innocuous 
than “Big Brother” doing so),247 and the bipartisan efforts to offer 
guidance and solutions to the problem.248 
                                                 
244. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied en banc 
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 
(2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), and aff’d on other 
grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
245. However, some have argued that state court conception and societal views have 
been foreclosed as influences on the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  See 
Kerr, D.C. Circuit, supra note 181 (noting that the Maynard court’s “reliance on state laws for 
its view that the expectation of privacy is reasonable seems plainly foreclosed by Virginia v. 
Moore and California v. Greenwood”). 
246. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
247. Apple and Google were discovered to be tracking user locations and transmitting 
that information back to the companies, igniting public concern over personal privacy.  See 
Byron Acohido, Lawmakers Request Probe of Tracking by Apple and Google, USA TODAY, 
Apr. 24, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/money/usaedition/2011-04-25-iPhone-Tracking_ 
ST_U.htm.  Officials from both companies were brought in front of Congress to testify about 
the tracking.  Jim Puzzanghera, Apple, Google Officials Testify, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2011, at 
B1.  Senator Leahy’s statements from that panel are indicative of the growing public concern: 
 
 Like many Americans, I am deeply concerned about the recent reports that the 
Apple iPhone, Google Android Phone and other mobile applications may be 
collecting, storing, and tracking user location data without the user’s consent. . . . 
 They have good reason to be concerned.  The collection, use and storage of 
location and other sensitive personal information has serious implications regarding 
the privacy rights and personal safety of American consumers. 
Protecting Mobile Privacy: Your Smartphones, Tablets, Cell Phones and Your Privacy Before 
the S. Sub. Comm. on Privacy, Technology and the Law, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of 
Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
248. A bi-partisan group of legal experts and former law enforcement officers has 
agreed with Maynard’s interpretation in principle, and called for limits on how police can use 
GPS.  See CONST. PROJECT LIBERTY & SEC. COMM., supra note 20, at 3–7.  The report states 
that “[a] warrant based on probable cause should be required before law enforcement may 
seek GPS or other electronic location tracking information for a period extending beyond 24 
hours.”  Id. at 5–6; Emily Babay, Report Urges Limits on Police Use of GPS Tracking, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Sept. 22, 2011), http://washingtonexaminer.com/local/crime-punishment/2011/09 
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Second, a judicial conception of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy must adequately address the amount of information that can 
potentially be gathered about a person through various forms of 
technology—with some limiting function that articulates a reasonable 
duration of time over which data collection can occur.249  It is generally 
conceded that GPS can function to gather an inordinate amount of 
intimate information and for a significant duration.250  Thus, as 
commentator Renee Hutchins has noted, “the extensive database of 
information collectable through the use of GPS-enabled surveillance 
justifies affording some constitutional limitation on police use of the 
technology.”251  And addressing time duration, Hutchins has argued that 
“it is entirely consistent with existing precedent to understand the level 
of proof required from one who challenges covert tracking as bearing an 
inverse relationship to the length of time such surveillance is 
conducted.”252 
The Maynard court’s “mosaic theory” was successful in addressing 
the amount of information that GPS could potentially reap and, to some 
extent, the duration issue.253  The court recognized that prolonged 
surveillance could paint an “intimate picture of the subject’s life that he 
expects no one to have—short perhaps of his spouse.”254  By invoking a 
conception of the whole being distinct from the sum of its parts, the 
                                                                                                                     
/report-urges-limits-police-use-gps-tracking. 
249. See Kerr, D.C. Circuit, supra note 181.  Kerr offered his skeptical take of 
implementing Maynard’s precedent: 
 
Much of the problem is knowing when the line is crossed when a bunch of non-
searches become a search.  The Supreme Court has stressed the need for clear rules 
that tell the police what they can and cannot do.  But how do the police know when 
a mosaic has been created such that the sum of law enforcement techniques, when 
aggregated, amount to a search?  Are they supposed to carry around a D.H. 
Ginsburg Aggregatormeter that tells them when it’s time to get a warrant?  Take 
the case of Maynard.  One-month of surveillance is too long, the court says.  But 
how about 2 weeks?  1 week?  1 day?  1 hour?  I have no idea. 
Id. 
250. See supra text accompanying note 174; United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 
(D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied en banc sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 
131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), and aff’d on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
251. Hutchins, supra note 35, at 458. 
252. Id. at 455; see also Otterberg, supra note 81, at 697–98. 
253. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562. 
254. Id. at 563. 
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court was able to address both data aggregation as well as correlation.255  
This “mosaic” formula divorces the qualitative component of evidence 
from its quantitative component, so that its impact can be measured in 
its component parts and method of acquisition.256  It facilitates the 
reasonable notion that one “do[es] not expect that for weeks or months 
at a time the various bits and pieces of [his or her] daily routine will be 
woven together in an unbroken stream” to divine likely relevant, but 
unquestionably intrusive, things about his or her life.257  What the 
“mosaic” does not do, admittedly, is denote a time-frame over which use 
of GPS transforms an acceptable law enforcement practice into a Fourth 
Amendment search.  While this is a weakness of adopting “mosaic 
theory” to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is no more amorphous 
than the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test itself.258  And, 
arguably, what the Maynard court’s holding lacks in specificity, it makes 
up for two-fold in flexibility. 
Third, the reasonable expectation of privacy standard must be 
pushed past the “inside/out” problem and become a forward-thinking 
approach to encapsulate all new technologies that might possibly 
emerge.259  As commentator Orin Kerr concedes, “the inside/outside 
distinction operates sensibly in a physical investigation governed by 
human eyesight.”260  Society has moved outside of these limited bounds 
with GPS because GPS can do what law enforcement practically cannot 
do—real-time, round-the-clock surveillance.261  While Katz did provide a 
shift away from bright line boundaries between public and private, this 
shift has not been sufficient.  GPS tracking, more than any technology 
widely used, “highlight[s] the need for the Fourth Amendment to offer 
                                                 
255. Id. at 561–62. 
256. The government contends, however, that aggregation of a lot of information is 
often the goal in an investigation.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 223, at 32.  The government 
also argues that “mosaic” theory “has the potential to destabilize Fourth Amendment law and 
to raise questions about a variety of common law-enforcement practices.”  Id. 
257. Hutchins, supra note 35, at 455. 
258. Katz, along with the entire body of Fourth Amendment law, has been criticized for 
its lack of clarity.  See supra text accompanying note 57. 
259. See supra text accompanying note 233. 
260. See Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment, supra note 88, at 1011. 
261. See Otterberg, supra note 81, at 667–68 (“[GPS] can last for weeks at a time . . . 
[and] police could acquire constant, real-time, precise location information about that vehicle 
for much longer than they practically might be able to maintain round-the-clock visual 
surveillance.”). 
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protection even within the public space.”262  One functional method of 
addressing the “inside/out” problem is to view the data collectively, not 
based on location, but on the information it reveals.  Undoubtedly, the 
concern an individual has in privacy is equated less with where the data 
was gathered and more with what that data divulges.  The Maynard 
court’s holding is most successful in addressing the “inside/out” problem 
that has dogged Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ad nauseum.  The 
court’s holding does what Kyllo could not: it provides “essential 
guidance” to address situations in the future that have been foretold in a 
line of Supreme Court cases that have dealt with technology and the 
Fourth Amendment.263  The Maynard court’s holding does not falter 
when presented with a novel place from which to gain evidence, or a 
novel method for doing so.  Its focal point is on the amount of 
information that is revealed about the subject through the component 
parts of evidence.  It gives judicial authority to contemplate whether the 
evidence presented reveals information to a degree no one could have 
contemplated as a reasonable matter because of the scope, amount, and 
method used to gather it—if so, then the process by which it was 
obtained was a search under the Fourth Amendment.264  Moreover, it 
facilitates “a Fourth Amendment analysis better equipped to handle 
changes brought about by technology [that] focus[es] less on physical 
boundaries and more on whether allowing the law enforcement practice 
at issue would alter the degree of privacy experienced by society before 
the technology existed.”265 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While there may be other judicial solutions to GPS tracking,266 the 
                                                 
262. Id. at 694. 
263. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001) (“[T]he rule we adopt must 
take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”).  
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Kyllo called into question the holding’s “essential guidance.”  Id. at 
46 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
264. See Gershman, supra note 51, at 958 (asserting that with GPS monitoring “there can 
be a legally significant difference in terms of the degree, scope, and duration of an intrusion 
into privacy”). 
265. See Otterberg, supra note 81, at 699. 
266. The government does offer an alternative solution in its Brief for United States v. 
Jones, arguing that even if the use of GPS was a search or seizure, it could still be justified 
under the Supreme Court’s “general Fourth Amendment approach.”  Brief for the United 
States, supra note 223, at 47–52 (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006)).  
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Maynard court’s focus on the method and type of information to 
determine a violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy is a move in 
the right direction.  A novel approach to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is direly needed to confront the challenges that 
technology will continue to bring.  Additionally, if the judiciary 
continues to bury its head in the metaphorical sand of Knotts while the 
complexity of systems that can be used to track an individual increases, 
society will be self-propagating the waves of advancement against an 
individual’s zone of privacy.  Soon, the bubble of autonomy that 
individuals cling to as a fundamental right will be washed away, the 
Fourth Amendment’s historical meaning will be significantly diluted,267 
and this inaction will unwittingly facilitate a normative shift in the 
conception of privacy that may not be undone. 
JUSTIN P. WEBB* 
                                                                                                                     
This balancing approach entails weighing the degree of the intrusion (search or seizure) on an 
individual’s privacy against the need for promoting a legitimate governmental interest.  
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001); see also CLANCY, supra note 33, at 
489–507.  However, the government’s argument is flatly untenable because the majority of 
cases it is based on involve specialized situations not requiring a warrant because of their 
unique nature.  See Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (parolees have a diminished expectation of 
privacy); United States v. Flores-Mantano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004) (noting that the 
expectation of privacy at the border is diminished, and “[t]he Government’s interest in 
preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international 
border”); Knights, 534 U.S. at 119–20 (probationers have a diminished expectation of 
privacy); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (students have lesser expectation of 
privacy in school and warrant requirement would be unworkable).  It is unclear if this 
argument will even be considered, since it was not used in the lower courts.  Brief for 
Respondent, supra note 89, at 54–55. 
267. The meaning of the Fourth Amendment has been described in various ways; 
however, Professor Taslitz’s description of one of the Fourth Amendment’s expressive 
functions is particularly applicable: 
 
[T]he Fourth Amendment can be seen as serving yet a final expressive function: 
educating the People in the necessity for individualized justice based on . . . the 
need to restrain all three branches of government, as well as the People themselves, 
from exercising arbitrary power over others’ lives, privacy, property, and 
locomotion.  For the state to treat any person as less than a unique individual 
entitled to be free from governmental intrusions absent significant evidence of his 
wrongdoing violates the terms of the American social contract. 
ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789–1869, at 44 (2006). 
* J.D. expected, 2013, Marquette University Law School;  B.S., 2003, UCLA.  I would 
like to thank my beautiful wife Sara, who has loved me (and the ghost of me while I wrote 
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this), unconditionally.  I am forever blessed by the love and support of my parents and 
brother, as well, and I could not have crafted this without Professor Alison Julien’s guidance.  
I dedicate this piece to friends lost, but not forgotten. 
 
